U.S. Drug Policy

Reducing Demand

Counter-Drug Activities

National Drug Control Strategy

International Narcotics Control

U.S. Drug Policy

EDITOR
Chandley McDonald

DESIGNER
Chloe Ellis

ADDITIONAL GRAPHICS
Barbara Long

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS
Kathleen Hug
Gary Keith
Monica Mieroszewska
Rosalie Targonski

The Web-in-Print series of pamphlets contains a selection of material from the U.S. Information Agency's World Wide Web Site. The address is: **www.usia.gov/usis.html**

1998
CONTENTS

Reducing the Demand for Drugs

The following is excerpted from the remarks of President Bill Clinton to U.S. Coast Guard Personnel at the U.S. Coast Guard Station, Miami, Florida, on December 11, 1997.

For the last five years we have been moving this country toward the 21st century, with a vision to provide opportunity for everyone responsible enough to work for it, to maintain our leadership in the world, and to pull our increasingly diverse people closer together. That has required us to have an aggressive view of what the national government's role is, but a very different one. Not that we could sit on the sidelines or that we could solve all the problems, but that we had a sharpened responsibility to create the conditions and give people the tools to solve their own problems and make the most of their own lives.

Our economy is the healthiest in a generation; our world leadership is strong; we're making headway across a whole range of social problems; crime is at its lowest rate in 24 years. We've had a record drop in people on the welfare rolls, moving into the workplace. But surely we cannot meet all the challenges facing the American people unless we can break the deadly grip of crime related to drugs, and drug dependence itself, on our young people especially and on our communities across the country.

I've come to Causeway Island today because I want America to know that off the coast of Florida you are waging a battle for America's future and America's children. The ammo is live, the dangers are real, and I want America to know you are making a big difference.

Almost two years ago General Barry McCaffrey [director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy] and I came with the attorney general to Miami to launch a comprehensive antidrug strategy for the nation — a commonsense plan to address an uncommonly complex problem: prevention to keep children from turning to drugs; treatment to help break the cycle of addiction and crime; interdiction to reduce the flow of drugs; law enforcement to break up the sources of supply; and the largest counter-drug budget in history to back it up.

Thanks in no small measure to heroic efforts on the high seas, in the air, and along our borders, the strategy is starting to show promising results. In the area of interdiction, the Coast Guard and its partners have just completed a banner year, increasing arrests of traffickers by 1,000 percent and seizures of cocaine by 300 percent....

I also want to congratulate the U.S. Customs Service on its success, particularly the drug seizure off the coast of Miami earlier this week. Senior Special Agent Joe Goulet...single-handedly pulled alongside a drug-running vessel, cutting through the waves at 20 miles an hour, disabled the vessel and dove back into his own vessel before it raced away. With the help of Coast Guard personnel and air support, he and his fellow

Customs officers seized more than 2,000 pounds of cocaine, the 10th major seizure in South Florida in the last six weeks alone.

This is an impressive record. But we know we must do more because the drug cartels will do more — after all, there's a lot of money in this. So we're already deploying new technologies, increasing the Customs budget, doubling the number of border patrol agents along the southwest border. And today I'm committing another $73 million to the Defense Department's $800 million counter-narcotics budget to help support the interdiction efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean.

In all this we'll have to continue to work even more closely with our neighbors and our allies across the hemisphere. Mexico will soon launch with us our first joint counter-drug strategy. This spring we'll be with all the democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean at the Summit of the Americas in Chile, where we will do our best to build a true hemispheric alliance against drugs.

We'll also continue to work — as we work to protect our borders — with law enforcement on the streets of America, targeting gang violence associated with drugs, helping people to adopt the kinds of strategies that, where adopted, have led to dramatic drops in drug trafficking and violence....

The one thing General McCaffrey recognized not long after he took office is that we can spend all the money in the world on interdiction, we can spend all the money in the world on law enforcement, we can spend all the money in the world even on preventive strategies — but somehow, some way, our children have to decide that we will stop becoming the world's largest consumer of drugs. If we have 4 percent of the world's population and we consume nearly half the drugs, we're going to have trouble. There will be big money in it, and we'll have to put big money and enormous resources and the lives of our finest young people in uniform against the effort. We have got to change the culture in America which has so many of our young people becoming willing drug users. The numbers are encouraging. They're going down. But they're still far too large.

A lot of this has to be done by people who deal with our young people one on one, starting with their parents. But government can help. I want to applaud General McCaffrey for having the guts to go to Congress and ask them to give us $195 million for a media campaign next month....we had to reach our children however we could, whenever we could, in the best way that we could.

I want to say, when these things start, I hope they will remind the parents, the teachers, the coaches, the religious leaders that they have to take the lead in making our children strong enough to take the right stands and turn away from drugs.

This is not — this war on drugs, as it's often called — an offensive against a single enemy conducted by a single army. Instead, it's more like...in a marathon race where there are lots of people running at different paces in different ways; everyone that finishes ought to get a medal; and it requires strength and determination and conditioning and unbelievable patience. It requires also a certain courage never, never to stop in the face of the relentless obstacles ahead.

That's what this is. We're making progress in this marathon. The Coast Guard is leading the way. But all of us have a role to play, and we better determine to play it if we expect the 21st century to be America's best years.

Stemming the Cross-Border Flow of Drugs

Following are excerpts of questions and answers from a press briefing given by General Barry McCaffrey, director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, in Miami, Florida, on December 11, 1997.

Q: Do you know, General, how much illegal narcotics are making their way into the United States now?

McCaffrey: It's my belief we've got about 300 metric tons of cocaine coming into the country, probably about 10 metric tons of heroin, and a lot of other drugs — methamphetamines, who knows — half of it is made in the United States, half of it made in Mexico. And the seizure rates we've got are proportionate to that effort.

But the whole drug thing is dynamic. For example, heroin has changed in a very fundamental way in the last three years. Now, last year, for the first time in the country's history, 62 percent of our heroin seizures were Colombian heroin as opposed to Burmese Golden Triangle heroin. Vessels seized were 30, with drug seizures — this is Operation Frontier Shield — 31,000 pounds plus of drugs.

Q: Sir, to what do you attribute the recorded drop in overall drug use in cocaine, crack — why do you think this is apparently happening?

McCaffrey: There's a longer view and a shorter view. We've got two major drug problems; one is we've got 4 million Americans chronically using, compulsively using illegal drugs — hardcore addicted. The biggest number of those are cocaine addicts. And so it's still out there, and that's a problem. Now, the second problem is our children are using drugs in increasing numbers. Last year, for the first time in five years, it went down. We're a little bit tentative on claiming we've turned the corner, but clearly last year it started down.

Now, [for] the longer run, you look at it and cocaine use is down by 70-plus percent. The numbers we use are 6 million Americans down to 1.7 million Americans. And a proportionate — a tremendous — drop in marijuana use. A lot of the reason was [that] by about the late 1970s, America got disgusted with the impact of drug abuse on our society. The police forces were screwed up, the university faculties were stoned, the Armed Forces was marginally able to do its job because of drug abuse. And so one of the things you saw was more than 4,000 antidrug coalitions spring up all over America and tremendous focus by the news media on the problem.

And it worked. It dropped drug abuse in America, we say from 26 million Americans down to well under 13 million. Then we stopped talking about it, we got bored with the issue — I use 1990 as the year. A new generation came along...they hadn't seen all this damage of the 1970s. And it started back up again

By the way, we saw the same thing at the beginning of the century — 1900 and 1920. We saw the same thing in the 1870s, 1880s, after the Civil War. Drug abuse rises up, people get disgusted, it's wrecking their workplace, their homes, crimes — and they start reacting. So what we're up to now, the heart and soul of this strategy, is there is 6 percent of the population using drugs right now. We say in 10 years, drop it to 2 percent or over. Cut it to the lowest use rate in recorded American history and do it in 10 years.

Q: The president said it's a banner year. What's a banner year? Is it the most drugs ever seized? Is it just a lot of drugs?

McCaffrey: I think it was the best year ever for the Coast Guard, hands down. It's certainly the most organized we've ever been. We finally got a system where we think we're pulling together, so we're pretty optimistic. But there's a lot more to do.

The drug threat can't be solved with interdiction, but...my orders are, by the State of the Union speech [late January 1998], to have a concept ready to share...on the southwest border initiative. We're going to try and stop drug smuggling into the United States across the Mexican-U.S. border in the next five years — substantially stop it — while still allowing our second biggest trading partner to continue economic cooperation.

Q: What are your initial thoughts on how that can be accomplished? That's a tremendous feat.

McCaffrey: The biggest open border in the world is the United States and Mexico, and the numbers are staggering. There's nothing like it anywhere on the face of the earth. It's 260 million people a year; it's 82 million cars, 3.5 million trucks, 340,000 rail cars.

And if you go to one of the 39 places on the border where that traffic is coming back and forth, you watch 10 miles of trucks backed up in Mexico. Now we've got 20,000 men and women in the [U.S.] Customs Service who are trying to stop these drugs with hand-held mirrors and hand-held technology. But we've tested a couple of devices. We took some X-ray machines designed to look through Soviet ICBM shipping containers — part of the START I regime. We said, let's use them on trucks, let's use them on rail cars. They work. They absolutely work.

You can see 20 kilograms of cocaine inside lead in the battery container or welded into walls of the truck, or suspended by wires in a load of wet concrete. And so what we said is, we've got to proliferate this stuff and we've got to go to the 39 ports of entry, we've got to allow trucks to come across, we've got to improve the intelligence system so it supports Customs and the border patrol.

It's already working, but we need to give [Customs officers, border patrol, and the Drug Enforcement Administration] intercept information. My guess is, give us five years of hard work, get technology in the hands of the Customs Service, do fencing and sensor technology and an adequate border patrol, and we can make it so difficult to smuggle these incredibly lethal cargoes across the border that they'll go to sea. And we want them out at sea, not wrecking the U.S.-Mexican civil population with corruption and violence. And, by the way, we're going to follow them to sea, too.

Q: Before you do, General, describe the budget fight. What's happening with that?

McCaffrey: Scarce dollars. You've got to make a good case for what you're up to. I went down and presented a one-hour argument to Congressman Bob Livingston, House Appropriations Chairman, about the 1999 budget. And I've talked to [Treasury Secretary] Bob Rubin, [Director of the Office of Management and Budget] Frank Raines, [President Clinton's Chief of Staff] Erskine Bowles, to make the case to pay for a national strategy that will drop drug abuse by 50 percent in the next 10 years.

Today the President announced a $73 million increase in the Department of Defense [DOD] budget. DOD is only a modest supporting element in the national drug strategy, but I'm enormously grateful for Secretary [of Defense] Cohen's support in increasing his budget, this 1999 budget going to OMB. I think we're on the right track, bottom line. But you've got to make the case for dollars.

Q: Is that DOD money — does some of it get to the Coast Guard or is that completely separate?

McCaffrey: No. The Department of Transportation funds the Coast Guard. That $73 million increase is going to go to Caribbean interdiction, Mexican counter-smuggling operations in Mexico, the Andean Ridge Strategy — Peru, Bolivia, Colombia — and then, finally, the Caribbean initiative. We went down with the president to Barbados and had a Summit of the Caribbean. So now we're going to go back and fund some initiatives to support these 18 binational agreements we've done in the last two years with Caribbean-based nations.

Major Players in the War on Drugs

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

The principal purpose of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is to establish policies, priorities, and objectives for the nation's drug control program, the goals of which are to reduce illicit drug use, manufacturing, and trafficking; drug-related crime and violence; and drug-related health consequences. To achieve these goals, the director of ONDCP is charged with producing the National Drug Control Strategy, which directs the nation's antidrug efforts and establishes a program, a budget, and guidelines for cooperation among federal, state, and local entities.

By law, the director of ONDCP also evaluates, coordinates, and oversees both the international and domestic antidrug efforts of executive branch agencies and ensures that such efforts sustain and complement state and local antidrug activities. The director advises the president regarding changes in the organization, management, budgeting, and personnel of federal agencies that could affect the nation's antidrug efforts; and regarding federal agency compliance with their obligations under the strategy.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

The mission of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States. It also brings to the criminal and civil justice system of the United States or any other competent jurisdiction those organizations and people involved in growing, manufacturing, or distributing controlled

substances destined for illicit traffic in the United States. Finally, the DEA recommends and supports nonenforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances on the domestic and international markets. In carrying out its mission, DEA is the lead agency responsible for the development of overall federal drug enforcement strategy, programs, planning, and evaluation.

DEA's primary responsibilities include:

- Investigation and preparation for prosecution of major violators of controlled substance laws operating at interstate and international levels;
- Management of a national drug intelligence system in cooperation with federal, state, local, and foreign officials to collect, analyze, and disseminate strategic and operational drug intelligence information;
- Seizure and forfeiture of assets derived from, traceable to, or intended to be used for illicit drug trafficking;
- Enforcement of the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act as they pertain to the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of legally produced controlled substances;
- Coordination and cooperation with federal, state, and local law enforcement officials on mutual drug enforcement efforts and enhancement of such efforts through exploitation of potential interstate and international investigations beyond local or limited federal jurisdictions and resources;
- Coordination and cooperation with other federal, state, and local agencies, and with foreign governments, in programs designed to reduce the availability of illicit abuse-type drugs on the U.S. market through nonenforcement methods such as crop eradication, crop substitution, and training of foreign officials;
- Responsibility, under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State and U.S. ambassadors, for all programs associated with drug law enforcement counterparts in foreign countries;
- Liaison with the United Nations, Interpol, and other organizations on matters relating to international drug control programs.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, CUSTOMS SERVICE

The mission of the United States Customs Service is to ensure that all goods and persons entering and exiting the United States do so in accordance with all U.S. laws and regulations. This mission includes:

- Enforcing U.S. laws interdicting narcotics and other contraband;
- Protecting the American public and environment from the introduction of prohibited hazardous and noxious products;
- Assessing and collecting revenues in the form of duties, taxes, and fees on imported merchandise;
- Regulating the movement of persons, carriers, merchandise, and commodities between the United States and other nations while facilitating the movement of all legitimate cargo, carriers, travelers, and mail;
- Interdicting narcotics and other contraband;
- Enforcing certain provisions of the export control laws of the United States.

Its major narcotics interdiction efforts include: the Canine Program Team (CP), which in 26 years has accounted for over 100,000

narcotic and dangerous drug seizures; Operation HARD LINE, to permanently harden America's southwest border ports of entry from drug smugglers; the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC), a business-led, Customs-supported alliance created to eliminate the use of legitimate business shipments by narcotics traffickers to smuggle illicit drugs; and the Carrier Initiative program, which is aimed at deterring smugglers from using commercial air and sea conveyances to transport narcotics, and preventing narcotics from getting on board conveyances.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS

The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) works with foreign governments to increase awareness of the importance of global narcotics control. It coordinates efforts with other governments and international organizations to halt the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by providing assistance to foreign governments to eradicate narcotics crops, destroy illicit laboratories, train interdiction personnel, and develop education programs to counter drug abuse by their populations.

The INL narcotics control program has two primary goals:

- To use the full range of U.S. diplomacy to convince foreign governments of the importance and relevance of narcotics to bilateral and multilateral relations and to promote cooperation with the United States;
- To employ the bureau's various programs to help stop the flow of illegal drugs to American soil. The program is implemented through bilateral agreements with foreign governments (numbering approximately 85).

The bureau also has an international criminal justice office, dedicated to development and coordination of U.S. policy on: combating international organized crime's involvement in financial crime and illicit drug trafficking; strengthening judicial institutions and assisting foreign law enforcement agencies; and coordinating with the United Nations and other international organizations to assist member states in combating international criminal activity.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK

The mission of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is to support and strengthen domestic and international anti-money-laundering efforts and to foster interagency and global cooperation to that end through information collection, analysis, and sharing; technological assistance; and innovative and cost-effective implementation of Treasury authorities.

FinCEN administers the Bank Security Act, which is the core of the Treasury Department's efforts to fight money laundering. FinCEN is also a national leader in international efforts to build effective counter-money-laundering policies and cooperation.

In addition, FinCEN is the nation's central point for broad-based financial intelligence, analysis, and information sharing, to support the fight against financial crime. Its information-sharing network, which includes most federal as well as state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the nation, provides increasingly

sophisticated analytical tools to empower other agencies with enhanced abilities to combat money laundering.

FinCEN is becoming an international leader in the fight against financial crimes and the corresponding corruption of international economies. FinCEN supports the G-7 Financial Action Task Force, which came under the presidency of the United States for the seventh round (1995-96). In addition, FinCEN coordinates with financial intelligence units (FIUs) in scores of countries, including Britain, France, Belgium, and Australia. FinCEN is also using its expertise to help establish FIUs worldwide.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) works to improve the quality and availability of substance abuse prevention, addiction treatment, and mental health services. SAMHSA carries out its work through several centers, including the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP) and the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT).

CSAP's mission is to provide national leadership in the federal effort to prevent alcohol, tobacco, and illicit drug problems that are intrinsically linked to other serious national problems such as crime, violence, rising health care costs, and low work productivity. CSAP connects people and resources to innovative ideas and strategies, and encourages efforts to reduce and eliminate alcohol, tobacco, and illicit drug problems both in the United States and internationally. CSAP maintains the National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information (NCADI), an information service that is a resource for current information and materials about alcohol and other drugs.

CSAT works cooperatively across the private and public treatment spectrum to identify, develop, and support policies, approaches, and programs that enhance and expand treatment services for individuals who abuse alcohol and other drugs and that address individuals' addiction-related problems.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE

The mission of the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), part of the National Institutes of Health, is to lead the nation in bringing the power of science to bear on drug abuse and addiction. This charge has two critical components: the first is the strategic support and conduct of research across a broad range of disciplines. The second is to ensure the rapid and effective dissemination and use of the results of that research to significantly improve drug abuse and addiction prevention, treatment, and policy.

For the past two decades, NIDA has been exploring the biomedical and behavioral foundations of drug abuse. NIDA's scientific research program addresses the most fundamental and essential questions about drug abuse, ranging from its causes and consequences to its prevention and treatment.

U.S. Counter-Drug Activities at Home and Abroad

Following is the text of a December 24, 1997, State Department fact sheet on U.S. counter-drug activities.

The president's Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) presents to the administration each year a national drug control strategy. This year's strategy embraces five broad goals:

- Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco;
- Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence;
- Reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use;
- Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat; and
- Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply. The vast majority of the budget for counter-narcotics programs is applied to the first three goals.

The overall budget for counter-drug activities, which includes large research and development requests tied primarily to the Counter-drug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC), amounted to $26.731 billion in 1996, $35.838 billion in 1997, and a requested $36.016 billion in 1998. For 1996, $16 billion went to research, while that figure was $18 billion for both 1997 and 1998. The remaining budget amounts represent money to be spent on operations, or better stated, activities that directly impact on the daily lives of millions of U.S. citizens.

The overall budget request for counter-narcotics operations for fiscal year 1998 is $15.977 billion. This amount includes money specifically authorized by Congress for counter-narcotics programs. The $15.977 billion figure represents a 5.4 percent increase over the FY97 total of $15.159 billion and is nearly 16 percent greater than the $13.454 billion spent in FY96.

The budget is broken down into the following broad categories (billions of U.S. dollars):

	1996	1997	1998
Criminal justice system	6.267	6.961	7.249
Drug treatment	2.554	2.809	3.004
Drug prevention	1.301	1.648	1.917
International programs	.290	.296	.289
Interdiction	1.321	1.639	1.610
Research	.609	.632	.674
Intelligence	.115	.146	.159

U.S. criminal justice programs include the federal judiciary, Bureau of Prisons, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Naturalization (INS), Interpol, and local policing initiatives, among others. Drug treatment includes federal funding and counterpart spending on drug treatment programs across the nation.

Drug prevention is specifically aimed at demand reduction and education, especially for at-risk teen populations. Interdiction is targeted at blocking the free movement of illicit narcotics into the United States and narcotrafficking organizations that prey on U.S. citizens. The international spending is program money spent specifically supporting counter-narcotics efforts in supply source countries.

The international component of counter-drug operational spending has never exceeded 6 percent of the total spending (1991 and 1992), and it currently represents only 2 percent of the overall budget request for FY98. When the budget is broken down into functional areas, it looks like the following (in billions of U.S. dollars):

	1997	Percent	1998	Percent
Demand reduction	4.692	35	4.440	33
Domestic law enforcement	6.983	53	7.402	55
International	.296	2	.289	2
Interdiction	1.280	10	1.321	10

The American government expends the bulk of its antinarcotics resources fighting the drug war within its own borders. More than 5 of every 10 dollars is spent on domestic law enforcement programs, while nearly 9 of every 10 dollars is spent on demand reduction or law enforcement.

Counter-drug program accomplishments and trends in drug use and abuse: The number of people (12 and older) who regularly use drugs in America dropped from 14 percent in 1976 to just 6 percent in 1996. The number of cocaine users dropped 70 percent in the last decade (5.7 million in 1985 to 1.7 million in 1996).

Teen drug use dropped in the latest survey for the first time in several years (10.9 percent in 1995 to 9 percent in 1996). There is also a declining trend in the use of crack cocaine, with the majority of large cities in the United States showing significant declines in use and only a handful with increasing use of this dangerous drug. Likewise, most cities, including the eight with highest reported rates of use, report that methamphetamine abuse is declining. Drug-related crimes have also declined in the last few years across America.

The number of drug-related arrests in the United States has risen dramatically as the federal government has increased its commitment to making America's streets safer. In 1992 about 1 million individuals were arrested in drug-related crimes; that figure rose to 1.5 million in 1996. Beginning in 1995, the federal drug law enforcement efforts began to target kingpin and mid-level dealers, dismantling several important East Coast trafficking networks. In 1995, 94.3 percent of all federal drug convictions were for trafficking (as opposed to sales) of illicit narcotics. The primary means for extending this work is the creation of more High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) programs.

The five current HIDTAs will be expanded to 17 in FY98. The HIDTA program provides supplemental funding to federal agencies and provides money to make these organizations joint ventures, with local and state law enforcement joining their federal counterparts.

The U.S. government has also targeted foreign trafficking organizations with significant influence in the U.S. illicit narcotics market. Working with the government of Mexico since 1995 in targeting the Amado Carillo Fuentes organization has led to more than 100 indictments in the United States and the seizure of 11.5 tons of cocaine, 13,646 pounds of marijuana, and more than $ 18.5 million in assets. Prosecution of the Arellano Felix organization has led to 14 indictments. One of the Arellano Felix brothers, Ramon, is on the FBI's top 10 most wanted list, while the Department of State is offering up to $ 2 million for information that will lead to his arrest and conviction. The U.S. government has also dismantled important Colombian, Nigerian, and Jamaican organizations that imported multi-ton shipments of a variety of drugs into the United States (heroin, methamphetamines, marijuana).

Most importantly, though, the message about drugs is being heard by Americans. More Americans are concerned about drugs and the influence of drug use on our society than ever before. Polling data consistently show that Americans rate drugs as one of the most serious problems facing our youth. Likewise, Americans are getting personally involved in counter-drug programs and projects to treat chronic drug users.

The greater concern about the problems associated with drugs has increased media coverage about the problems.

The U.S. government is committed to the most comprehensive national drug control strategy ever. The 10-year plan and five-year budget establish priorities, match those with funding, and provide means to measure progress. The goal-oriented strategy will move America further toward a drug-free environment. The first measure of commitment is innovative programs that:

1) Target the youth with a media campaign that will use all of the power available (newspapers, television, radio, Internet) to reach America's youth with the message that drugs are dangerous;

2) Assist our communities with grants that will strengthen 14,000 antidrug community coalitions in cities and towns across the country; and

3) Create even more High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area programs that target cities particularly susceptible to the problem of drug use.

A second measure of commitment to counter-drug programs is the budget itself. Growing by more than 25 percent since 1992, the current operational budget of $16 billion shows the commitment of the U.S. government to counter-drug programs. Within the budget, the largest one-year increase came in demand reduction efforts, where allocations jumped 22 percent. The administration has made prevention of drug use and abuse its highest commitment.

Finally, the new strategy details measures of effectiveness that will show where the programs are not meeting pre-established goals. These measures are quantifiable, attainable, and practical. These measures make the government programs accountable to Congress and the American people.

The charge that the United States only fights its drug war abroad is false. The figures cited above show that the vast majority of America's commitment is domestic and that it involves reducing demand, preventing sales, treating abuse, and targeting the suppliers of drugs to American citizens. The comparatively small amount of money spent on international

programs is intended to reduce the supply of illicit narcotics to the United States. At the same time, though, it helps those countries that receive U.S. assistance reduce the influence of narcotics traffickers in their societies and economies. The use of American budgetary resources abroad will assist both the United States and our allies in making drugs less available in all countries.

The international budget may also be the most productive in terms of "bang for the buck." In 1996, working closely with its allies, the U.S. international program was responsible for removing 300 metric tons of cocaine from the trafficking system. This was accomplished despite the ability of the narcotraffickers to outspend the United States, manipulate corrupt officials, and otherwise sabotage antidrug operations. For the annual investment of about 2 percent of the federal counter-drug budget, the programs eliminated $30 billion worth of cocaine profits for the traffickers. While much still needs to be done, especially in the area of demand reduction, the U.S. government is committing the necessary resources to attack our domestic drug problem.

Focusing on High-Drug-Use Areas

By Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration

The United States and its friends must concentrate their resources to contend with the "staggering" power of international narcotics cartels, said Thomas Constantine, head of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in addressing a conference of federal, state, and local officials from the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) of the United States on December 2, 1997. Following are excerpts from that address.

I believe as we analyze drug trafficking, we can all agree that the situation is serious. The fact that there are so many areas of our country designated as High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas speaks to the true nature of the drug problem.

When the HIDTA program was first created, our nation had not yet seen the spread of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine to rural areas as we are seeing now. We had not yet experienced the full impact of sophisticated drug trafficking groups that are operating on a global scale.

Right now we are in the midst of a drug situation that involves increases in teen drug use, more social acceptance of drugs than we have seen in the recent past, specific regional drug problems, and the growing influence of international narcotics traffickers who operate on a global scale. All of these problems are serious and require solutions at all levels of law enforcement.

Today's international organized crime drug-trafficking syndicates represent a significant threat to our national security. In the past, organized crime groups were headquartered on U.S. soil, and it was possible for law enforcement to identify leaders, observe and infiltrate their organizations, and eventually arrest and

prosecute their top echelons. The major groups having an influence on our nation today are headquartered in Colombia or Mexico and conduct their business from cities such as Cali or Guadalajara. The leaders of these organizations — the Caro Quintero group, Amado Carillo Fuentes' organization, the Amezcua organization, the North Coast traffickers, and so on — do not generally leave the safety of their home countries. It is therefore more difficult for U.S. law enforcement to apprehend, arrest, and prosecute these top leaders.

The international narcotics trade that operates today on a global scale involves several levels, all of which are integral to the overall success of the drug trade. Without the national distribution groups that work directly for the international drug lords, and without the local distribution groups that supply communities across the United States, kingpins like Amado Carillo Fuentes or the Amezcua brothers would not be in business.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY

Where organized crime figures in the United States once conducted their business behind the closed doors of social clubs in Queens [New York] or New Jersey, today's organized crime bosses use encrypted computers, cell phones, and faxes to keep in contact with their surrogates operating in the United States. The tools that we used against the traditional mafia, including conspiracy cases, racketeering statutes, and electronic surveillance, now must be used on a far grander scale. We must also rely on international tools like extradition and on the willingness of other governments to cooperate with us in order to bring these drug lords to justice.

Our most serious current challenge is dealing with the powerful and vicious drug traffickers from Mexico, who have assumed greater prominence in the last year. Since the arrests of the major figures of the Cali mafia in 1993 and 1996, the Mexican groups have stepped in as the most significant players affecting our nation today.

Since Colombian traffickers began paying transporters from Mexico in cocaine instead of cash during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Mexican traffickers have capitalized on their expertise in polydrug smuggling to attain a new level of significance in the global drug trade. They are now the dominant force in cocaine and methamphetamine trafficking, and have also expanded their share in the heroin market.

OPERATIONS LIMELIGHT AND RECIPROCITY

Two cases this year, worked by DEA [the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration] as HIDTA cases in conjunction with state, local, and other federal law enforcement organizations, demonstrate the power and reach of traffickers from Mexico. Operations Limelight and Reciprocity, which came to a conclusion in August 1997, provided a real insight into the mechanics of the cocaine trade and proved to us that traffickers from Mexico are playing a major role in the drug trade within the United States. HIDTA support came from Los Angeles, El Paso [Texas], and Phoenix [Arizona].

Operation Limelight began with the seizure of 320 kilograms of cocaine in Yuma, Arizona, in August 1996. Information obtained in this seizure put us in touch with the head of the cocaine cell in Los Angeles, and electronic surveillance of this cell head began. In December, almost 1,500 kilos of cocaine were seized, and the wiretap

information indicated that this cocaine was supposed to have been delivered to Colombians in New York.

The Los Angeles cell head was arrested, and agents learned that he was working for relatives of Amado Carillo Fuentes who were based in Mexico City. Through the wiretap, we also were able to identify the command and control structure of this organization throughout the country. The cell head for the United States was located in Chicago. We also learned that subordinates were moved from the West Coast to the East Coast.

In New York, wiretaps revealed that encrypted phone conversations were used by the Mexican traffickers. After additional seizures of cocaine intended for Colombian and Dominican distributors, and the seizure of 1,630 kilograms of cocaine in a truck coming from McAllen, Texas, the case came to closure.

What Operation Limelight illustrated was the transition from the traditional role that Mexican cocaine traffickers were accustomed to. Prior to 1996, Mexicans were transporting cocaine to Colombians in Los Angeles; now they were making direct deliveries to their Colombian and Dominican distributors in New York.

Operation Reciprocity, the complementary investigation, began with two Operation Pipeline seizures in 1996. I believe that [Operation Pipeline] is the most important and cost-effective interdiction in the world. Pipeline has removed as many drugs from our nation's highways as have been seized by all U.S. drug interdiction activities in the international transit zones and at our borders.

Over an 8-year period, from 1988 to 1996, total seizures as part of Operation Pipeline have been remarkable: $314 million in U.S. currency; 85 metric tons of cocaine; 1 ton of methamphetamine; 556 metric tons of marijuana; 538 kilograms of crack cocaine; and 176 kilograms of heroin. Equally impressive were the 1997 results: $41 million in U.S. currency; 5,100 kilos of cocaine; 648 kilos methamphetamine; 96,794 metric tons of marijuana; 71 kilograms of crack cocaine; and 86 kilograms of heroin.

Operation Pipeline is the program most closely associated with the El Paso Intelligence Center. It highlights training, real-time communications, and analytic support. Each year, state and local highway officers conduct dozens of training schools across the country for other highway officers. These schools inform officers of interdiction laws and policies, build their knowledge of drug trafficking, and sharpen their perceptiveness of highway couriers.

Cop-to-cop training is the foundation of Operation Pipeline. The schools are primarily taught by state and local law enforcement officers with years of experience in highway drug interdiction. Since 1993, over 22,000 state and local law enforcement officers have attended over 270 Pipeline schools.

And now back to Operation Reciprocity. In October, two Texas Department of Public Safety troopers near Tyler, Texas, stopped a truck heading south to El Paso and seized $2 million that had been hidden in bundles. Two months later, the same troopers stopped a truck headed north and discovered 2,700 pounds of marijuana. During this seizure, the driver cooperated and identified warehouses in El Paso and New York, which led to the seizure of 1.5 tons of cocaine. On December 3, 1996, the Tucson Police Department and drug task force officers, thanks to an anonymous call, raided a warehouse containing 5.3 tons of cocaine. We ultimately connected this seizure to the same organization that was

impacted by the Texas troopers' earlier interdiction efforts.

Wiretaps were initiated in 10 cities based on information developed in conjunction with the seizures. Through these wiretaps, the command and control functions of the group were identified as part of the Amado Carillo Fuentes organization in Mexico City. Agents were able to tie together cells in Juarez, Mexico, New York — with warehouses in New Rochelle [New York], the Bronx [New York City], and Jersey City [New Jersey] — Los Angeles, where the U.S.-based coordinator was located, and Battle Creek, Michigan.

The Mexican organization had contracted with a trucking firm from Battle Creek to transport the cocaine and cash returning to Mexico. This firm had a clean, reliable fleet, and the belief was that the trucks would not be stopped for safety violations, increasing the drivers' chances that they could make an unimpeded run. Following his arrest, the driver from Battle Creek indicated that in one year he had transported over 30 tons of cocaine to Chicago and New York and returned over $100 million in bulk cash to Mexican cell heads. When we step back and look at the fact that this was just one driver, working for only one cell, it is staggering to realize the scale of these international operations.

THE METHAMPHETAMINE PROBLEM

The Mexican traffickers are also deeply involved in the methamphetamine trade. In recent years, methamphetamine use has been on the rise in the United States and has had a devastating effect on many communities across the nation.

In essence, we are facing two methamphetamine problems; one is the production of methamphetamine in smaller "mom and pop" type labs where individuals cook enough meth to sell and sometimes supply their own meth habit. Then there is the large-scale methamphetamine production and trafficking problem that is attributable to Mexican traffickers. These traffickers either produce meth in the Michoacan area of Mexico and transport it into the United States, or they produce large quantities of meth in this country — mostly in the Los Angeles and southern California areas — and traffic it to other regions.

Because Mexican traffickers are able to obtain large supplies of ephedrine, which is the ingredient necessary for methamphetamine production, and because of their long-standing polydrug smuggling networks, Mexican traffickers have been able to dominate the methamphetamine market.

NATIONAL AND LOCAL DRUG DISTRIBUTION

Many of the most significant drug trafficking cases do not begin in foreign countries but on the streets of the United States, where drug mafia surrogates operate multi-billion businesses. By targeting the highest level of the international drug trade within the United States — usually these distributors — and by building conspiracy cases against them, their bosses, and their subordinates, we have a better chance of shutting down the operations of these large groups.

For many Americans, the local drug dealers, who are frequently violent, are the most visible manifestation of this nation's drug problem. But it is critical for us to remember that these dealers would not be in business were it not for the international drug lords and their U.S. franchises who supply the cocaine, heroin, meth, or

marijuana that is sold on street corners all around the nation.

The rising levels of violence that accompany the drug trade are carried out by the local drug gangs, and many of the drug-related homicides that are committed are connected directly or indirectly to the drug lords who call the shots from their headquarters in Cali or Guadalajara.

DEA RESPONSE

It has always been DEA's philosophy that we must attack all three levels of the international drug trade simultaneously and with equal vigor. Each of these levels is critical to the effectiveness of the international drug trade, and without intense focus on the domestic distributors and the local drug groups, we are generally not able to make strong cases against the drug lords operating from abroad.

To that end, DEA is working with HIDTA and with state and local law enforcement to maximize our effectiveness as a government in our fight against international drug traffickers.

DEA's MET program is another part of the equation. By working with state and local counterparts in 108 deployments in cities and towns around the country, DEA has arrested over 4,700 individuals on drug, homicide, and weapons charges. The impact of MET cases should not be understated since, by removing the most violent and visible drug traffickers from communities, we are denying the international drug lords and their cell heads in major cities one-third of their operation.

INCREASES IN YOUTH DRUG ABUSE

In addition to the problem posed by major international traffickers from Colombia and Mexico, our nation is also facing a problem closer to home — the increase in drug use among young people and the dangers that this increase poses to our entire society. While it is true that drug use levels have been cut in half since 1985, we are witnessing a very troubling rise in drug use among young people and an erosion of anti-drug attitudes that, in the past, helped young people reject drugs.

Until the Persian Gulf War, the media had paid a lot of attention to the drug issue and had played up the successes, as well as giving an honest assessment of the true nature of our nation's drug problem. In this climate, when opinion-makers were clearly opposed to the drug culture, it was easier for the government and the private sector to produce and air many memorable antidrug messages, such as those produced by the Partnership for a Drug Free America.

In today's climate, it is more difficult to get the word out. Fewer media outlets provide prime time and space for antidrug messages. Music, movies, and television are depicting drug use in a light-hearted manner. Instead of portraying the 1960s as a time of great social upheaval, there seems to be nostalgia for that time that ushered in our latest, tragic drug epidemic.

In this environment, the legalization argument has found fertile ground. It is frequently wrapped up in the compassion argument, which had resonance in California and Arizona, where the alleged medicinal uses of marijuana were publicized. We are facing the same challenge in Florida and the District of Columbia, where ballot initiatives are in the works. We also understand that although the

State of Washington was not successful in enacting a legalization initiative through the ballot process in November, the issue will most likely be revisited by the state legislature.

The entire legalization issue sends a terrible message to the children of this country, and it is essential that all of us work diligently to educate opinion-makers, parents, and community leaders about the consequences of such a policy.

THE NEED FOR HIDTAs

It is now more important than ever that we combine our expertise through programs such as the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program to maximize our effectiveness and chart new courses in the ever-changing battle against international drug trafficking. The HIDTA program has several benefits that give it unique status as a response to local and national drug problems — flexibility; tailoring to meet special drug-trafficking issues, such as meth; a healthy budget; congressional sponsorship and interest in outcomes; and a leadership dedicated to getting the job done.

The next several years will be important and challenging ones for all of us. At some point, large budget increases will evaporate, and we will need to make some hard choices about where the money should be used most effectively. Increasingly, we will be pressed by Congress to provide tangible evidence of success. And perhaps most important, we will have to anticipate emerging drug problems and come up with a game plan in a timely manner so we can address the problem — whether it be methamphetamine or marijuana. It will also be critical for us to ensure that each HIDTA has some standard elements that allow us to interact with other HIDTAs and other law enforcement mechanisms to further maximize our effectiveness.

The U.S. Effort to Fight Drug Use

The following is excerpted from an article by Senator Charles E. Grassley, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, that was written for the USIA electronic journal Global Issues.

There are a variety of misconceptions about the drug problem in general and what the United States is doing about it. The biggest misconception involves oversimplified distinctions made between supply and demand. The most common argument is that if Americans did not consume drugs — no demand — there would be no incentive to produce and smuggle drugs — no supply. While this seems plausible, it does not reflect the complexity of the relationship between supply and demand generally or with drugs more specifically.

In many cases, it is supply that drives or creates demand. No new product, for example, for which there is no current market begins with demand. The creator and manufacturer of the product must create the demand through marketing, pricing, and advertising. Similarly, when a business wants to break into a market, it will often try to flood the market with large quantities of its goods at low prices. This is true whether we're talking about computer chips or cocaine....For drug traffickers, breaking into the American market was tapping into the opportunity for huge profits. As part of a business strategy, these groups targeted the American market and aggressively worked to create a demand for their product.

The evolution of these activities is easy to trace. The United States in the early 1970s had no serious cocaine problem. Use was confined to the cultural elite with the money to pay the high price for the drugs. Carlos Lehder, an enterprising smuggler, realized the possibilities for creating a new market. Using his connections in Colombia and his smuggling networks, he began to increase the supply of cocaine in the United States. He targeted middle-class users. By dramatically increasing the supply and lowering the price, he made cocaine more available, helping to create a demand. Once the demand began to grow, supply and demand began to complement one another. While he was doing this, U.S. law enforcement and policy-makers missed the significance of what was happening. It was not until there was an explosion of violence and spreading addiction problems that authorities realized what was going on. By then, cocaine had established itself across the country as a major drug of choice.

A similar story can be told about the rapid expansion of methamphetamine use in the United States....No country is immune to this pattern.

In discussing this aspect of the drug problem, I am not arguing that the United States has no responsibility to deal with drug use. Quite the contrary. We have a responsibility and an obligation, not only as responsible members of the international community but also as parents trying to protect our children, who are the

primary victims of drug use. My point in discussing the issue of supply and demand is to make clear that the problem is not a simple one. There is a further issue to consider in addressing this misconception. It is a moral question. The question is, simply put: who is more responsible for the drug problem, the person who chooses to use illegal drugs or the person who produces, transits, and sells them? There are no simple answers, but the point is that neither producing countries nor consumers can afford to ignore the problems created by illegal drugs.

THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS

A second misconception involves the certification process in the United States. Many seem to believe that this is an unfair process that singles out other countries arbitrarily for blame while the United States does nothing to combat drug use at home....[In fact,] the United States devotes considerable resources to the drug problem. We do this because we are fighting for the lives and futures of our children. We take the drug problem very seriously at home, and we expect others to do the same. The certification process is the mechanism that we use to determine that seriousness of purpose.

Many critics of certification argue that the United States has no right to judge the efforts of other countries on drugs. This is not a very tenable position....As members of the international community, we expect countries to adhere to certain standards of conduct, and we are prepared, individually and collectively, to respond when those standards are violated. In addition, every country reserves the right to take necessary steps to protect its sovereignty and the well-being of its citizens.

The Congress instituted the certification requirement some 10 years ago to force U.S. administrations to make drugs a key element in our foreign policy. What certification requires is that the U.S. president must identify those countries that are major producing or transit countries for illegal drugs. This is not some arbitrary determination but is based on actual estimates of crop size in individual countries or on specific information on smuggling activities. Congress further requires the president to certify each year which countries on this list are taking realistic and credible steps to deal with drug production or transit. Again, this is not an arbitrary decision but is based on an assessment of specific actions and efforts. These are covered in a comprehensive report, the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, that Congress also requires the administration to submit every year.

The requirement for certification is not an absolute success. The expectation in the law is not that country X will have eliminated drug production or transit in order to be certified, but that it has taken meaningful steps leading to the suppression of these activities, either in conformity with the 1988 UN Convention or in bilateral agreements with the United States or others....

If the president determines, based on an evaluation of a number of factors, that a country is not meeting its obligations, then the president must report this to Congress and must take steps to withhold U.S. assistance to that country. That the United States has a right to determine whether or not a country is qualified to receive U.S. assistance should not be a matter of debate. U.S. assistance is not an entitlement....

Drugs are produced overseas and smuggled into the United States by organizations operating

from foreign soil in violation of local, international, and U.S. laws. The substances that they produce and smuggle cause incalculable damage to American citizens daily. Indeed, drug smugglers cause more deaths and more harm in this country annually than have international terrorists in the past 10 years. To ignore these activities is not possible, nor is it responsible. To expect other countries to cooperate in the effort to control these illegal activities is neither unrealistic nor unprecedented. To be prepared to take unilateral steps in order to protect the nation's interests is also not extravagant.

U.S. COUNTER-DRUG SPENDING

The third misconception that percolates through the debate on drugs is that the United States does nothing to deal with its own problem....The U.S. effort at home consumes the overwhelming majority of federal funds and, of course, all the monies spent by state, local, and private groups. This totals more than $30,000 million annually. Federal counter-drug resources are spent in four main areas: treatment, prevention, law enforcement, and international programs. Considerable sums are also allocated to research in these same areas.

In 1988, Congress created the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the "Drug Czar," to coordinate all federal drug control programs. Congress requires the administration to present each year a national drug control strategy. As part of that strategy, the law requires the administration to submit a consolidated budget based on the strategy....

Law enforcement resources in the budget cover a number of activities, including investigations, court proceedings, incarceration costs, and small sums for drug treatment programs in prisons. This request also includes some $10 million, for example, to the National Forest Service to combat illegal marijuana production in several parks. It includes support to state governments for marijuana crop eradication.

Treatment assistance goes to support treatment programs for addicts across the country....This money supports a variety of treatment efforts, from long-term residential programs to various forms of intervention programs designed to help addicts....We also support prevention efforts. The goal is to persuade potential users to never start.

In addition to the resources that the United States devotes to control the domestic problems of drug use, we also spend considerable sums to interdict drugs at and beyond our borders. We support international efforts to stop the illegal production and transit of drugs overseas....In the last five years, the United States has spent over $500 million in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru alone to support law enforcement, interdiction, alternative development, treatment and prevention, and military support. This money has gone to assist in local efforts to combat not only illegal drug production but also to deal with the threats posed by major criminal organizations that use violence, intimidation, and corruption to undermine the integrity of the courts, businesses, and political leaders.

U.S. efforts to combat drugs have not stopped at spending money on the problem. The United States, particularly the Congress, has pioneered legislation to create the appropriate legal framework to combat drug production and money laundering. In this regard, the United States created some of the first major anti-money-laundering and criminal enterprise legislation....These laws have been aggressively

employed against individuals involved in the drug trade, in the United States and abroad.

As part of the effort to control drug production, the United States also pioneered legislation to control the sale and transit of the precursor chemicals used in the production of illegal drugs. This law gave U.S. law enforcement agencies a powerful tool to prevent the diversion of key chemical components in drug production. The United States has encouraged other countries to adopt similar laws and has worked with individual companies to develop self-regulating mechanisms.

As part of its overall efforts to promote comprehensive drug control, the United States has also worked with the international community. The United States has worked with the G-7 countries to promote international standards for appropriate financial controls through the Financial Action Task Force. Congress has also put great emphasis on international compliance with the 1988 UN Convention on Psychotropic Drugs. In addition, the United States has supplied money to the United Nations Drug Control Program to promote treatment prevention, crop eradication, and alternative development projects in many different countries....

THE LEGALIZATION ISSUE

There is one further issue in this vein that I wish to address, and that is the notion that legalizing drug use would solve all the problems. In this view, simply legalizing dangerous drugs for personal use would end criminal activities, would reduce the harm of punitive legal steps against consenting users, and would do away with the need for the whole, expensive architecture of enforcement. None of these views is accurate. Indeed, as a formula for public policy they court disaster. At a minimum, they would dramatically increase the number of current users of dangerous drugs. Rather than reduce the harm currently caused by drugs, they would redistribute the harm to a large number of individuals and foist the costs for this onto the public purse.

There is no royal road to a solution of our drug problem, either supply or demand. What is required is determination to deal with the problem, a willingness to act, and stamina to stay the course. The consequences of failure mean losing more kids and giving free reign to the criminal thugs that push the drugs.

The President's Message

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

On behalf of the American people, I am pleased to transmit the *1998 National Drug Control Strategy* to the Congress. The *1998 Strategy* reaffirms our bipartisan, enduring commitment to reduce drug use and its destructive consequences.

This year's *Strategy* builds upon the *1997 Strategy* and is designed to reduce drug use and availability in America by half over the next 10 years — a historic new low. This plan has been developed under the leadership of General Barry McCaffrey, director of National Drug Control Policy, in close consultation with the Congress, the more than 50 federal agencies and departments involved in the fight against drugs, the dedicated men and women of law enforcement, and with stakeholders — mayors, doctors, clergy, civic leaders, parents, and young people — drawn from all segments of our society.

I am also proud to report that we have made real and substantial progress in carrying out the goals of the *1997 Strategy*. Working with the Congress, we have begun the National Anti-Drug Youth Media Campaign. Now when our children turn on the television, surf the "net," or listen to the radio, they can learn the plain truth about drugs: they are wrong, they put your future at risk, and they can kill you. I thank you for your vital support in bringing this important message to America's young people.

Together, we enacted into law the Drug-Free Communities Act of 1997, which will help build and strengthen 14,000 community anti-drug coalitions, and brought together civic groups — ranging from the Elks to the Girl Scouts and representing over 55 million Americans — to form a Civic Alliance, targeting youth drug use. By mobilizing people and empowering communities, we are defeating drugs through a child-by-child, street-by-street, and neighborhood-by-neighborhood approach.

We have also helped make our streets and communities safer by strengthening law enforcement. Through my administration's

Community Oriented Police (COPs) program, we are helping put 100,000 more police officers in towns and cities across the nation. We are taking deadly assault weapons out of the hands of drug dealers and gangs, making our streets safer for our families. We have taken steps to rid our prisons of drugs, as well as to break the vicious cycle of drugs and crime. These efforts are making a difference: violent crime in America has dropped dramatically for five years in a row.

Over the last year, the United States and Mexico reached agreement on a mutual *Threat Assessment* that defines the scope of the common threat we face and an alliance that commits our great nations to defeating that threat. Soon, we will sign a bilateral strategy that commits both nations to specific actions and performance benchmarks. Our work to enhance cooperation within the hemisphere and worldwide is already showing results. For example, Peruvian coca production has declined by roughly 40 percent over the last two years. In 1997, Mexican drug eradication rates reached record levels, and seizures increased nearly 50 percent over 1996.

We are making a difference. Drug use in America has declined by 50 percent over the last decade. For the first time in six years, studies show that youth drug use is beginning to stabilize, and in some respects is even declining. And indications are that the methamphetamine and crack cocaine epidemics, which in recent years were sweeping the nation, have begun to recede.

However, we must not confuse progress with ultimate success. Although youth drug use has started to decline, it remains unacceptably high.

More than ever, we must recommit ourselves to give parents the tools and support they need to teach children that drugs are dangerous and wrong. That is why we must improve the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program and other after-school initiatives that help keep our kids in school, off drugs, and out of trouble. We must hire 1,000 new border patrol agents and close the door on drugs at our borders. We must redouble our efforts with other nations to take the profits out of drug dealing and trafficking and break the sources of supply. And we must enact comprehensive bipartisan tobacco legislation that reduces youth smoking. These and other efforts are central elements of the *1998 National Drug Control Strategy*.

With the help of the American public, and the ongoing support of the Congress, we can achieve these goals. In submitting this plan to you, I ask for your continued partnership in defeating drugs in America. Our children and this nation deserve no less.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Drug Control Strategy:

An Overview

"The care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction, is the first and only legitimate object of good government."

—Thomas Jefferson
President of the United States
1801-1809

INTRODUCTION

The first duty of government is to provide security for citizens. The Constitution of the United States articulates the obligation of the federal government to uphold the public good, providing a bulwark against all threats, foreign and domestic. Drug abuse, and the illegal use of alcohol and tobacco by youngsters under the legal age, constitute such a threat. Toxic, addictive substances are a hazard to our safety and freedom, producing devastating crime and health problems. Drug abuse diminishes the potential of citizens for growth and development. Not surprisingly, 56 percent of respondents to a survey conducted by the Harvard School of Public Health in 1997 identified drugs as the most serious problem facing children in the United States.[1]

The traditions of American democracy affirm our commitment to both the rule of law and individual freedom. Although government must minimize interference in the private lives of citizens, it cannot deny people the security on which peace of mind depends. Drug abuse impairs rational thinking and the potential for a full, productive life. Drug abuse, drug trafficking, and their consequences destroy personal liberty and the well-being of communities. It drains the physical, intellectual, spiritual, and moral strength of America. Crime, violence, workplace accidents, family misery, drug-exposed children, and addiction are only part of the price imposed on society. Drug abuse spawns global criminal syndicates and bankrolls those who sell drugs to young people. Illegal drugs indiscriminately destroy old and young, men and women from all

racial and ethnic groups and every walk of life. No person or group is immune.

A COMPREHENSIVE 10-YEAR PLAN

Strategy determines the relationship between goals and available resources. Strategy guides the development of executable operational plans and programs to achieve goals efficiently. Strategy sets timetables that can adjust as conditions change. Finally, strategy embodies and expresses will. The *National Drug Control Strategy* proposes a 10-year conceptual framework to reduce illegal drug use and availability by 50 percent by the year 2007. If this goal is achieved, just 3 percent of the household population aged 12 and over would use illegal drugs. This level would be the lowest recorded drug-use rate in American history. Drug-related health, economic, social, and criminal costs would also be reduced commensurately. The *Strategy* focuses on prevention, treatment, research, law enforcement, protection of our borders, and international cooperation. It provides general guidance while identifying specific initiatives. This document expresses the collective wisdom and optimism of the American people with regard to illegal drugs.

MANDATE FOR A NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

The ways in which the federal government responds to drug abuse and trafficking are outlined in the following laws and orders:

- **The Controlled Substances Act, Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970** provided a comprehensive approach to the regulation, manufacture, and distribution of narcotics, stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens, anabolic steroids, and chemicals used in the production of controlled substances.

- **Executive Order No. 12564** (1986) made it a condition of employment for all federal employees to refrain from using drugs. This order required every federal agency to develop a comprehensive drug-free workplace program.

- **The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988** established as a policy goal the creation of a drug-free America. A key provision of that act was the establishment of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to set priorities, implement a national strategy, and certify federal drug control budgets. The law specifies that the strategy must be comprehensive and research-based, contain long-range goals and measurable objectives, and seek to reduce drug abuse, trafficking, and their consequences. Specifically, drug abuse is to be curbed by preventing youth from using illegal drugs, reducing the number of users, and decreasing drug availability.

- **The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994** extended ONDCP's mission to assessing budgets and resources related to the *National Drug Control Strategy.* It also established specific reporting requirements in the areas of drug use, availability, consequences, and treatment.

- **Executive Order No. 12880** (1993) and **Executive Orders Nos. 12992 and 13023** (1996) assigned ONDCP responsibility within the executive branch for leading drug control policy and developing an outcome-

measurement system. The executive orders also chartered the President's Drug Policy Council and established the ONDCP director as the president's chief spokesman for drug control.

EVOLUTION OF THE *NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY*

National Drug Control Strategies have been produced annually since 1989. Each defined demand reduction as a priority. In addition, the *Strategies* increasingly recognized the importance of preventing drug use by youth. The various documents affirmed that no single approach could rescue the nation from the cycle of drug abuse. A consensus was reached that drug prevention, education, and treatment must be complemented by supply reduction actions abroad, on our borders, and within the United States. Each *Strategy* also shared the commitment to maintain and enforce antidrug laws. All the *Strategies*, with growing success, tied policy to a scientific body of knowledge about the nation's drug problems. The *1996 Strategy* was a breakthrough that established five goals and 32 supporting objectives as the basis for a coherent, long-term national effort. These goals remain the heart of the *1998 Strategy* and will guide federal drug control agencies over the next decade. In addition, the goals will be useful for state and local governments and the private sector.

ELEMENTS OF THE *1998 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY*

Democratic: Our nation's domestic challenge is to reduce illegal drug use and its criminal, health, and economic consequences while protecting individual liberty and the rule of law. Our international challenge is to develop effective, cooperative programs that respect national sovereignty and reduce the cultivation, production, trafficking, distribution, and use of illegal drugs while supporting democratic governance and human rights.

Outcome-oriented: To translate words into deeds, the *Strategy* must ensure accountability. *Performance Measures of Effectiveness: A System for Assessing the Performance of the National Drug Control Strategy*[2] details long- and mid-term targets that gauge progress toward each of the *Strategy*'s goals and objectives.

Comprehensive: Successfully addressing the devastating drug problem in America requires a multifaceted, balanced program that attacks both supply and demand. Prevention, education, treatment, workplace programs, research, law enforcement, interdiction, and drug crop reduction must all be components of the response. Former "Drug Czar" William Bennett laid out in the *1989 National Drug Control Strategy* a principle that still applies today: "...no single tactic — pursued alone or to the detriment of other possible and valuable initiatives — can work to contain or reduce drug use." We can expect no panacea, no "silver bullet," to solve the nation's drug abuse problem.

Long-term: No short-term solution is possible to a national drug problem that requires the education of each new generation and resolute opposition to criminal drug traffickers. Our *Strategy* must be philosophically coherent and consistently followed.

Wide-ranging: Our response to the drug problem must support the needs of families, schools, and communities. It also must address

international aspects of drug control through bilateral, regional, and global accords.

Realistic: Some people believe drug use is so deeply embedded in society that we can never decrease it. Others feel that draconian measures are required. The *1998 Strategy* rejects both these views. Although we cannot eliminate illegal drug use, history demonstrates that we can control this cancer without compromising American ideals.

Science-based: Facts, based in science and data collection, rather than ideology or anecdote must provide the basis for rational drug policy.

GOALS OF THE *1998 STRATEGY*:

Goal 1: Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco.

Goal 2: Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.

Goal 3: Reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use.

Goal 4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

Thirty-two supporting objectives are elaborated in the *1998 Strategy*. The goals and objectives reflect the need for prevention and education to protect children from the perils of drugs; treatment to help the chemically dependent; law enforcement to bring traffickers to justice; interdiction to reduce the flow of drugs into our nation; international cooperation to confront drug cultivation, production, trafficking, and use; and research to provide a foundation based on science.

DRUG CONTROL IS A CONTINUOUS CHALLENGE

The metaphor of a "war on drugs" is misleading. Although wars are expected to end, drug control is a continuous challenge. The moment we believe ourselves victorious and drop our guard, the drug problem will resurface with the next generation. In order to reduce demand for drugs, prevention efforts must be ongoing. The chronically addicted should be held accountable for negative behavior and offered treatment to help change destructive patterns. Addicts must be helped, not defeated. While we seek to reduce demand, we also must target supply.

Cancer is a more appropriate metaphor for the nation's drug problem. Dealing with cancer is a long-term proposition. It requires the mobilization of support mechanisms — medical, educational, and societal — to check the spread of the disease and improve the prognosis. The symptoms of the illness must be managed while the root cause is attacked. The key to reducing both drug abuse and cancer is prevention coupled with treatment.

---

1 Harvard University/University of Maryland, *American Attitudes Toward Children's Health Care Issues* (Princeton, N.J.: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1997).

2 Published simultaneously with this document and on the ONDCP Web site.

The 1998 National Drug Control Strategy

White House Summary: On February 13, 1998, President Clinton released *The 1998 National Drug Control Strategy*, a comprehensive 10-year plan to reduce drug use and availability by half — a historic new low. The plan is backed by a $17 billion counter-drug budget — the largest ever presented to Congress, with an increase of a billion dollars over last year's budget.

Protecting America's Kids. The first goal of the Strategy is to educate and enable kids to reject drugs. Although current studies show that youth drug use rates may have started to decline, they remain unacceptably high. The Strategy gives parents the tools and support they need to teach their children that drugs are wrong and can kill you. That is why the largest percentage increase in drug funding (15 percent) is for programs that target youth, including:

- $195 Million National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign to make sure that when kids turn on the television, surf the "net," or listen to the radio, they learn about the dangers of drugs.
- $50 Million for School Drug Prevention Coordinators to improve and expand the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program by hiring more than 1,000 new prevention professionals to work with schools in preventing drug use.

Shielding Our Borders. The Strategy will shut the door on drugs at the border by committing more manpower and resources to fighting drugs. The Strategy includes:

- $163 Million for Border Patrol to hire 1,000 new Border Patrol officers and for "force multiplying" technology.
- $54 Million for Advanced Technology for the Customs Service to deploy advanced technologies, such as X-ray systems and remote video surveillance.
- $75.4 Million to Support Introduction Efforts in the Andean region and Caribbean and to train Mexican counter-drug forces.

Strengthening Law Enforcement. The Strategy calls for increasing the safety of our citizens by reducing drug-related crime and violence. New initiatives include:

- $38 Million to Crack Down on Methamphetamine and Heroin by hiring 100 new Drug Enforcement Administration agents, expanding the administration's anti-methamphetamine initiative, and targeting heroin traffickers.

Breaking the Cycle of Drugs and Crime. The Strategy calls for new funds to help states and local jurisdictions adopt coerced abstinence policies. It includes:

- $85 Million to Promote Coerced Abstinence to help state and local governments implement drug testing, treatment, and graduated sanctions for drug offenders.

Closing the Treatment Gap. Drug dependence exacts an enormous cost on individuals, families, businesses, communities, and the nation. Treatment can help to end this dependence and reduce the destructive consequences of drug use. This year's strategy includes:

- A $200 million Increase for Substance Abuse Block Grants to help states close the treatment gap.

Enhancing Multinational Cooperation. The Strategy calls for continued U.S. leadership and assistance to strengthen the international anti-drug consensus, including:

- $45 Million for International Programs for the Department of State to support nations involved in interdiction and counterdrug law enforcement.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: FIGHTING DRUGS AND PROTECTING OUR COMMUNITIES — A RECORD OF SUCCESS

- Overall Drug Use Is Down. From 1979 to 1996, the number of people (12 and older) regularly using drugs in America has plummeted 49 percent, from 25.4 million to 13 million people. Similarly, the number of cocaine users has dropped 70 percent in the last decade, from 5.7 million in 1985 to 1.7 million in 1996.
- Youth Drug Use Is Beginning to Reverse. For the first time since 1992, illicit drug use among 12- to 17-year-olds has declined. Between 1995 and 1996, teen drug use fell from 10.9 percent to 9 percent.
- Crack Use Is Declining. The most recent data from the Drug Use Forecasting Program show a decline in crack use by arrestees across the nation — a good indication that the crack epidemic that began in 1987 has finally begun to abate.
- Good News on Methamphetamine. Meth use is down in the 8 cities that had been suffering the highest increases in use: 52 percent drop in Dallas; 20 percent drop in San Jose; 19 percent in San Diego; 34 percent in Portland; and over 40 percent in Denver, Omaha and Phoenix.
- Cocaine Production Decreasing. In 1997, cocaine production in the Andean region, the primary cocaine-producing area, decreased by as much as 100 tons from the previous year.
- Spending on Drug Consumption Is Down. The most recent data shows the amount Americans spend buying illegal drugs is down roughly 37 percent from 1988 to 1995 — a total decline of $ 34.1 billion.
- Drug-Related Crime in Decline. According to the FBI, in 1992, there were 1,302 murders related to narcotics. By 1996, that number hit a low of 819.

HISTORIC AND HIGH-PROFILE ANTI-DRUG STRATEGY

- The Largest Anti-Drug Budgets Ever. Year in and year out, President Clinton has proposed the largest anti-drug budgets ever. Between 1996 and 1998, resources for drug control increased by 19 percent, from $13.5 billion in FY 1997 to $16 billion in FY98. The president's FY99 drug budget is $17.1 billion, including increases of $256 million for youth drug prevention, $364 million for domestic law enforcement, and $189 million for interdiction.

- Developed a Comprehensive National Drug Control Strategy. For the first time ever, the 1998 Strategy provides a 10-year plan to reduce drug use and its consequences in the United States by 50 percent — to historic lows. This "Strategy" will reduce illegal drug use through law enforcement, prevention, treatment, interdiction and international efforts. This "Strategy" is backed by a 5-year budget and performance benchmarks.

BUILDING HEALTHIER FUTURES FOR OUR CHILDREN AND COMMUNITIES

- Targeting Young People with a $195 Million National Anti-Drug Media Campaign. The president is launching a massive national media campaign to motivate America's youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse. This unprecedented $195 million paid media campaign relies on high-impact, antidrug television and radio advertisements aired during prime-time. In June, the campaign will go nationwide.

- Strengthening and Expanding the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act. President Clinton expanded the Drug-Free Schools Act into the Safe and Drug-Free Schools Act of 1994, making violence prevention a key part of this program. The Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program provides support for violence and drug prevention programs to 97 percent of the nation's school districts. Schools use these funds to keep violence, drugs and alcohol away from students and out of schools.

STOPPING DRUGS FROM CROSSING OUR BORDERS

- Put More Manpower and Resources into Fighting Drugs at the Border. The number of Border Patrol agents guarding our southwest border has doubled — from 3,389 in FY93 to 6,213 at the end of FY97. The number of Customs agents working on the southwest border has grown 16 percent from 2,000 in FY93 to 2,311 in FY97. The number of DEA, FBI, INS enforcement officers/agents and U.S. marshals on the Southwest border has also increased. Spending on Southwest border counter-drug efforts has increased: Customs up 72 percent (FY93-97); FBI up 21 percent(FY93-97); DEA up 30 percent (FY93-97); INS up 96 percent (FY93-97); and U.S. attorneys up 45 percent (FY93-97). The FY99 budget adds to this 1,000 new Border Patrol agents, and $ 54 million to Customs for advanced inspection technologies.

- Keeping Drugs off the Street — Border Seizures Are Up. The Clinton administration has increased seizures of marijuana by 86 percent — from 787,523 pounds in FY92 to 1,462,940

pounds in FY96. And seizures of heroin are up 32 percent — from 1,157 kilograms in FY92 to 1,532 kilograms in FY96.

WORKING INTERNATIONALLY TO PROTECT AMERICANS AT HOME

- Unprecedented Cooperation with Mexico to Fight Drugs. President Clinton and President Zedillo have signed two first-ever, historic counter-drug agreements: a binational drug Threat Assessment and a binational Counter-Drug Alliance, and are developing a historic bilateral counter-drug strategy.

- Standing Tough. Confronted with insufficient efforts to combat drugs and drug cartels, the Clinton administration decertified Colombia — sending a strong message about our commitment to fighting drugs. Last year, the Clinton administration successfully implemented "Zorro II," an effort to shut down a cocaine trafficking partnership between the Cali mafia and a major Mexican mafia trafficking organization.

- Building a Hemispheric Commitment to Fight Drugs. The administration is working through the Summit of the Americas Narcotics Action Plan, the 1996 Anti-Drug Strategy in the Hemisphere, and the 1997 OAS Anti-Drug Strategy to build a hemisphere strategy to combat drug use, production, trafficking and money laundering.

MAKING STREETS SAFE

- Developed a Comprehensive Strategy to Combat the Trafficking and Abuse of Methamphetamine. The president fought for and signed a methamphetamine strategy that increases penalties for trafficking in meth, and toughens the penalties for trafficking in those chemicals used to produce meth.

- Mandatory Comprehensive State Drug-Testing Plans for Prisoners and Parolees. President Clinton fought for and signed legislation requiring states to submit drug-testing plans for prisoners and parolees which would send them back to prison if they get back on drugs.

- Putting 100,000 More Police on Our Streets. The president's plan represents the federal government's biggest commitment ever to local law enforcement.

- Expanded the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program (HIDTA). Under the Clinton administration's leadership, the number of designated High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas — which provides additional resources and federal law enforcement assistance to help drug-plagued communities combat drug trafficking — has expanded significantly from 5 to 22 HIDTAs.

Excerpted from the *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (1997)*.
Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C., March 1998.

Overview for 1997

For the Western Hemisphere's antidrug effort, 1997 was a good year. We made appreciable gains in crop reduction, in interdiction, in weakening trafficking syndicates, strengthening law enforcement, and in targeting drug money laundering. The year's best news came from Peru, for years the world's largest coca growing country and source of much of the semi-processed cocaine base that feeds the Colombian cocaine industry. Three-plus years of joint efforts by U.S., Peruvian, and Colombian forces to choke off the "air bridge" that carries Peruvian cocaine base to Colombia for processing paid off handsomely. The operation simultaneously deprived the Colombian cocaine trade of critical basic materials and drove down the price of coca leaf in Peru below the break-even point. Disillusioned Peruvian growers abandoned fields to take advantage of alternative development opportunities. As a result of the exodus, in 1997 Peruvian coca cultivation dropped 27 percent, an extraordinary decline that occurred on top of last year's 18 percent reduction. The U.S. government estimates that Peru now cultivates 68,800 hectares of coca, just slightly more than half of the estimated 129,100 hectares identified in the peak year of 1992. In fact, Peru's coca cultivation is now at its lowest level since we began systematically estimating cultivation in 1986.

Crop control efforts in Bolivia and Colombia, the other two principal coca producers, brought both good news and bad. The Bolivian government's program of voluntary and involuntary eradication, enhanced by U.S. government assistance and alternative development incentives, brought down estimated cultivation by a little over 5 percent in 1997. Though this was a relatively modest decline, it was significant since, at 45,800 hectares, Bolivia's 1997 coca crop was also the smallest in 10 years. Colombia was a different story, since successful coca control operations also spurred new planting. Colombian traffickers accelerated their campaign to plant new coca outside the traditional growing areas, both to offset heavy losses from government eradication missions and to replace cocaine supplies cut off by the "air bridge" denial. The Colombian syndicates unquestionably are feeling the impact of crop destruction campaigns, since they have raised the eradication stakes by bringing in better weaponry and shifting cultivation to Colombia's southwest provinces of Caqueta and Putumayo, where a strong guerrilla presence makes eradication more difficult. Despite these hindrances, crop-spraying operations destroyed more than 19,000 hectares of coca in 1997. With 79,500 hectares

under cultivation at year's end, Colombia is now the largest coca cultivating country, though in actual leaf production, it still ranks behind Peru and Bolivia. Still, even taking into account the expansion in Colombia, this year's Andean coca cultivation total of 194,100 hectares was the lowest in a decade — proof that persistence pays.

We faced a different set of challenges in trying to limit the cultivation of opium poppy, the source of heroin. As we note in the section on heroin, this heavily addictive drug is gradually staging a comeback among a new generation of users in the United States. Unlike coca, which currently grows in only three Andean countries, opium poppy grows in nearly every region of the world. Because it is an annual crop with as many as three harvests per year, it is much harder to eliminate, especially since nearly 90 percent of the world's estimated opium gum production (3,630 out of 4,137 metric tons) is produced in Burma and Afghanistan, countries where we have limited influence. An increasing amount of the heroin entering the United States, however, comes from Colombia and Mexico, where we assist the governments in opium poppy eradication campaigns. Since cultivation is relatively limited — between them both countries account for less than 4 percent of the world's estimated production — eradication programs can have an appreciable impact. In 1997, the U.S. government estimates that Mexico eradicated 8,000 hectares, three quarters of its opium poppy cultivation, leaving 4,000 hectares for opium production. Despite a major effort by the Colombian drug syndicates to increase production, Colombian authorities kept the opium poppy crop to 6,600 hectares, approximately the same year-end level as in previous years. Eradication sorties destroyed an estimated 7,000 hectares, slightly more than half of the poppy under cultivation earlier in the year. The eradication results in Colombia and Mexico translate into a potential 150 metric tons of opium — 15 metric tons of heroin — that were not available to the U.S. market.

Trafficker Woes. For a number of important Western Hemisphere drug trafficking organizations, 1997 was not a good year. The Mexican drug rings suffered the most, as the Juarez Cartel lost its boss, the Gulf Cartel its operations manager, and the major methamphetamine smuggling ring one of its leaders. The sudden death in July of the Juarez Cartel's Amado Carrillo Fuentes (following plastic surgery intended to disguise his identity) reportedly has both weakened and triggered a war of succession in that organization. The powerful Gulf Cartel fared scarcely better. With its boss, Juan Garcia Abrego, already in jail in the United States in 1996, it suffered another blow when Mexican police collared Operations Chief Oscar Malherbe de Leon and Adan Amezcua Contreras, one of three brothers said to be responsible for much of the methamphetamine flowing into the U.S.

In South America, a joint Peruvian-Colombian operation captured Waldo Simeon Vargas Arias, ("El Ministro") in Bogota. Colombian and Peruvian authorities believe El Ministro was responsible for supplying over half the cocaine base refined by the Colombian cartels. He also appears to have been a major figure in the Colombian heroin trade. Peruvian antidrug forces caught up with long-sought drug chief Luis Molqui ("Lucho Mosca"), while Bolivian authorities extradited another important trafficker, Miguel Angel Seleme Rodriguez, to the

United States. to stand trial. Although the position of cartel boss never remains vacant for long, losing a leader inevitably hurts a drug syndicate's effectiveness. More importantly, capturing key traffickers demonstrates to the criminals and to the governments fighting them alike that the syndicates are highly vulnerable to coordinated international pressure sustained over time.

Other Advances. A long-standing element of our international drug control policy has been to encourage and assist governments to strengthen their judicial and banking systems to narrow the opportunities for their manipulation by the drug trade. In drug source and transit countries, law enforcement agencies have jailed prominent traffickers, only to see them walk free following a seemingly frivolous or inexplicable decision by a single judge. But the situation is gradually changing. In 1997, several countries continued the process of modernizing their laws and professionalizing their court systems through reforms ranging from installing more modern equipment to major changes in the way judges are appointed. Though there are still instances of judges arbitrarily dismissing evidence against or releasing well-known drug traffickers, the number of such cases is declining as governments make basic reforms such as giving judges better pay and greater personal protection.

Extradition. In 1997, we maintained pressure on governments to pass or amend laws and to enter into agreements to make possible the sanction drug lords fear most — extradition to the United States. The long sentences meted out to notorious drug criminals in the United States are stark reminders of what can happen to even the most powerful cartel leaders when they are subject to the U.S. justice system and can no longer manipulate their environment through bribes and intimidation. Several countries still prohibit the extradition of their nationals. As we approach the 21st century, we believe that such agreements can be made acceptable to most governments, as long as treaty provisions are reciprocal and balanced. In 1997, Paraguay and Peru agreed to negotiate new extradition treaties with the United States. We are currently working with countries important to the antidrug effort, such as the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, to adopt extradition procedures along the lines of the bilateral extradition treaty signed with Argentina in 1997 and Bolivia in 1996.

Money Laundering. We devoted considerable effort in 1997 to constricting the drug trade's access to international banking and financial systems. Since drug money is potentially worthless until it can be laundered and moved into legitimate financial and commercial channels, we have been working with our partners in the Financial Action and Caribbean Financial Action Task Forces to make it as difficult as possible for the drug trade to legitimize its fortune. While several countries' financial institutions regrettably are still willing to accept — or even solicit — funds of questionable provenance, we have seen important progress over the past year. Venezuela, for example, adopted new currency transaction

reporting requirements by all financial institutions; Panama established "due diligence" or "banker negligence" laws to hold individual bankers accountable for laundered funds; and Mexico published new anti-money-laundering regulations to require the reporting of large currency and suspicious transactions. Such measures move us closer to a common goal of eventually shutting drug money out of the international financial system.

Formidable Opposition. Though we can take pride in these accomplishments, we are still a long way from permanently crippling the drug trade. As one of the pillars of international organized crime, it remains a formidable enemy. Well before transnational crime had become recognized as one of the principal threats to international stability, the drug syndicates already had in place an impressive network of supply centers, distribution networks, foreign bases, and reliable entree into the governments of source and transit countries. They pioneered many of today's sophisticated money-laundering techniques, hiring first-rate accountants and investing in state-of-the-art technology. And when the Soviet Union collapsed, the drug syndicates were quick to recruit Eastern European chemists and other technical specialists left unemployed by the change in political systems. Even after suffering considerable losses, the drug trade's wealth, power, and organization equal or even exceed the resources of many governments.

Despite our collective efforts to cut drug traffic in 1997, hundreds of tons of cocaine flowed not only to the United States and Western Europe, but to markets in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the countries of the former Soviet Union. Colombian cocaine syndicates have established distribution centers on every continent, as international drug trafficking becomes more sophisticated every year. Now Italian, Turkish, Russian, and Nigerian crime syndicates, to name but a few, vie for a share of the business. The relatively straightforward flowcharts of trafficking routes of a decade ago have been replaced by a complex web of nodes and lines linking virtually every country in the world to the main drug production and trafficking centers.

The drug trade is adept at searching out and adapting to new opportunities. It is taking advantage of shifts in enforcement initiatives, along with trafficking and consumption patterns, as the lines blur between cocaine- and heroin-consuming countries. We are now observing more dual drug use, with addicts combining cocaine and heroin to offset each drug's respective stimulant and depressant effects. National tastes are also changing. Europe, once the preserve of the heroin trade, has developed an unhealthy and growing appetite for cocaine. This is especially true for Eastern Europe and Russia, where cocaine sells for up to $300 per gram, three times the average cost in the United States. North America, in turn, has rediscovered heroin, as cocaine use has declined sharply. (Between 1985 and 1996, the number of cocaine users dropped 70 percent, from 5.7 million to 1.7 million estimated users.) Although heroin use has not been rising proportionately, the Colombian drug syndicates' major investment in heroin production indicates that

they foresee an important market for heroin in the United States, most likely by promoting dual use of cocaine and heroin by consumers. Given the drug trade's past successes in anticipating trends, this is a disturbing development.

We have also witnessed an evolutionary process in the way drug syndicates are conducting their international operations. In the 1980s, Mexican trafficking organizations provided the Colombian trafficking syndicates with drug transportation services from Mexico to the southwest region of the United States. The Colombians paid the Mexican trafficking organizations from $1,500 to $2,000 for each kilogram of cocaine smuggled into the United States. During the 1990s, the Colombian and Mexican trafficking organizations established a new arrangement allowing the Mexican organizations to receive a percentage of the cocaine in each shipment as payment for their transportation services. The "payment-in-product" agreement enabled the organizations to become involved in the wholesale distribution of cocaine in the United States through their own distribution cells composed primarily of Mexicans. Prior to this, the U.S. wholesale cocaine trade was controlled exclusively by the Colombians. This new ethnic cohesion makes penetration more difficult and gives the syndicates leverage over family members in Mexico.

The Threat of Synthetics:

Methamphetamine. The demand for methamphetamine and other synthetic stimulants, including amphetamines and MDMA ("Ecstasy") has been increasing not only in the industrialized nations, but in most of the countries of the developing world. Methamphetamine, a hybrid relative of the "speed" of the 1960s, continues to rival cocaine as the stimulant of choice in many parts of the globe. The relative ease of manufacturing methamphetamine from readily available chemicals appeals as much to small drug entrepreneurs as to the large international syndicates, since neither has to rely on vulnerable crops, such as coca or opium poppy. Synthetics allow individual trafficking organizations to control the whole process, from manufacture to sale on the street. Synthetics also have large profit margins and can be made anywhere. Mexico is the principal foreign supplier of methamphetamine and precursors for the United States, but there are centers of methamphetamine production in countries as far apart as Poland, Japan, the Philippines, Burma, and Vietnam. We also have our own domestic methamphetamine production, as demonstrated by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's seizure of over 1,000 methamphetamine laboratories in 1997. State authorities seized hundreds more.

Amphetamines. In Europe, the last few years have been marked by an unprecedented demand for amphetamines and MDMA, or Ecstasy. Clandestine laboratories in the Netherlands and Poland are the primary suppliers of amphetamines to the European market, with the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries being the heaviest consumers. Amphetamine and MDMA production have taken a quantum leap, fueled by the need for increased supply.

MDMA (Ecstasy). The pervasive spread of MDMA, an amphetamine derivative, throughout Europe is linked closely to the so-called "rave culture" that has swept up the Continent's young

people. This "culture" has its own trendy lifestyle, complete with unique preferences in music and fashion. The association of Ecstasy with this faddish "techno-scene" is an added boon to suppliers. They count on lucrative returns by marketing the drug within the context of this popular movement. Ecstasy has developed an international cult following, to the point that there are Internet sites giving detailed instructions on how to make and use MDMA "safely." Most of the MDMA available on the European drug market is manufactured in clandestine laboratories in the Netherlands. It is too soon to tell whether methamphetamine and MDMA use is merely a transient but dangerous fad or whether it will become firmly rooted in the culture of urban youth. Left unchecked, however, it might well become the drug control nightmare of the next century.

Precursor Chemicals. Traffickers who manufacture stimulants and other synthetic drugs have a vulnerable point — the need for precursor chemicals. Whereas opiates and cocaine require widely available and relatively substitutable "essential chemicals," stimulant production requires "precursor chemicals," such as ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine. These chemicals have important but fewer legitimate uses and are commercially traded in smaller quantities to discrete users. It is crucial to chemical control that each country have an effective, flexible system that regulates the flow of key precursor chemicals without undue burdens on legitimate commerce. For that reason, the United States, the European Commission, and the UN's International Narcotics Control Board worked in 1997 with other states to establish an informal multilateral system of information exchange on chemicals.

Long-Term Progress. The drug trade, while powerful, is far from omnipotent. It is vulnerable on many fronts. It needs raw materials to produce drugs, complex logistic arrangements to move them to their destination, cadres of professionals to run the technical and financial aspects of its operations, and some means of making its profits legitimate. Above all, it needs the protection of a reliable core of corrupt officials in all the countries along its distribution chain. Repeated attacks on every front, even if seemingly insignificant by themselves, cumulatively are responsible for keeping the drug trade in check. Viewed out of context, the many achievements of individual countries may seem insignificant. Many never come to the attention of the press. The routine drug seizures, the jungle drug labs or airstrips destroyed every day, the arrests of corrupt officials, or the improved performance of police and judicial authorities benefiting from U.S. government assistance receive at best only fragmentary coverage in world media. Yet, as we have seen, cumulative effort and cooperation pay off. Ultimately it will be the sum of these small steps that will allow us to make lasting gains at the drug trade's expense.

Controlling Supply. Since our mandate is to stem the flow of illegal drugs to the U.S., our success depends on how effectively we attack drug supply beyond the country's borders. For the drugs that threaten us most directly, cocaine and heroin, we treat the process as a five-stage, grower-to-user chain, linking the drug producer

abroad with the consumer in the United States. At one end is the farmer growing coca or opium poppies in the Andes or Burma; at the other is the cocaine or heroin user in a U.S. town or city. In between lie the processing (drug refining), transit (shipping), and wholesale distribution links. We cannot expect to reduce the flow of drugs to the United States significantly unless we strike as close as possible to the source.

At each successive stage, the odds against stopping the flow increase markedly. Our international counter-drug programs therefore target the first three links of the chain: cultivation, processing, and transit. For drugs that are not completely synthetic, we stand our best chance if we can eliminate the first stage, cultivation, altogether. When crops are destroyed or left unharvested, no drugs can enter the system. It is akin to removing a malignant tumor before it can spread. Eradication is by far the most cost-effective means, but large-scale eradication may not be politically or socially feasible in many countries. Moreover, by itself eradication is not a panacea. As our recent experience in Peru has shown, the right combination of effective law enforcement actions and alternative development programs can also produce remarkable results. The U.S. government therefore has worked closely with the governments of the coca growing countries to find the best way to eliminate illegal coca in any given national context.

Coca Reduction. The coca crop offers the best prospect for dramatic reductions. Currently, significant coca cultivation takes place in only three countries — Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Current studies indicate that in Bolivia and Peru, where alkaloid content is high, every 200 hectares of coca eradicated deprives the drug trade on average of a metric ton of refined cocaine. (The ratio is higher for Colombia, where alkaloid content has traditionally been lower, though there are indications that yields may have increased considerably in recent years.) Unlike a load of finished cocaine distributed among trucks, boats, and aircraft, a coca field is a large, stationary target. So even manual eradication can make a difference. But we have better means available, high-speed spray aircraft. If permitted to do so, these planes could destroy a large percentage of the coca crop in a matter of months using environmentally safe herbicides. Since it takes between 18 months and two years for a coca bush to become fully productive, intensive aerial spraying campaigns could create serious cocaine shortages, at least for two years.

Political and economic conditions in some countries make eradication impractical. The U.S. government has therefore concentrated on working with each Andean government to find the best way to eliminate illegal coca in the light of prevailing local conditions. Though all three Andean governments agree in principle that coca cultivation must be reduced, only Colombia permits aerial eradication. Bolivia, where some coca is reserved for traditional uses (e.g., chewing), will only allow manual eradication, a process that is slow as well as dangerous to eradication personnel. Peru, until this year the largest cultivator, has been ambivalent, because it also produces some coca leaf for traditional purposes. In the past, its government would destroy seedbeds, but was not prepared to risk the political and economic consequences of eradication without assured, long-term compensation from abroad for displaced farmers. That situation, however, is changing.

The success of the "air bridge" denial in Peru has opened a new range of possibilities for crop control beyond just eradication. It has shown that a crop control strategy combining interdiction, enforcement, and alternative development incentives can also be highly effective. It may even prove transferable to other countries, provided that there is necessary patience, determination, and political will to carry out close, sustained cooperation.

Political Will. The most powerful weapon in fighting the drug trade is an intangible: political will. A first-class antidrug force, equipped with state-of-the-art police and military hardware, cannot succeed without the full commitment of the country's political leadership. Where political leaders have had the courage to sacrifice short-term economic and political considerations in favor of the long-term national interest, we have seen the drug trade weaken. And where they have succumbed to the lure of ready cash, the drug syndicates have prospered accordingly.

Contrary to the image that the large drug syndicates cultivate, they are far from invincible. The syndicates' prosperity hinges on establishing a modus vivendi with a weak or complacent government. In exchange for the short-term benefits of large infusions of drug money into the economy (or into their personal or political treasuries), corrupt government officials can limit counter-narcotics operations to those sectors least likely to harm trafficking interests. For example, the government of a major drug cultivation country can focus on interdiction rather than eradication. In a major drug refining country, government forces may eradicate some crops while allowing drug syndicates to exploit corrupt enforcement and timid judicial systems. In offshore financial centers, officials may launch anti-trafficking campaigns, while promoting bank secrecy and lax incorporation laws that facilitate money laundering. In every instance, the price of these short-term gains is the long-term entrenchment of drug interests. Consequently, a basic objective of U.S. antidrug policy is to prevent drug interests from becoming entrenched by strengthening political will in the key source and transit countries. For where political will is weak, corruption sets in, vitiates the rule of law, and puts democratic government at risk.

Corruption. When we fight the drug trade, we are also fighting political corruption. The drug trade feeds upon the social, economic, and moral decay that corruption fuels. Drug syndicates wield a powerful instrument for subverting even relatively strong societies: a money machine. Like modern-day Midases, they transform an intrinsically cheap and available commodity (e.g., coca leaves) into an almost inconceivably remunerative product. In terms of weight and availability, there is currently no commodity more lucrative than drugs. They are relatively cheap to produce and offer enormous profit margins that allow the drug trade to generate criminal revenues on a scale without historic precedent. Assuming an average retail street price of $100 a gram, a metric ton of pure cocaine has a retail value of $100 million on the streets of a U.S. city — two or three times as much if the drug is cut with adulterants. By this measure, the 100 or so metric tons of cocaine that the U.S. government typically seizes each year are theoretically worth as much as $10 billion to the drug trade — more than the gross domestic product of many countries. Even if only a

portion of these profits returns directly to the drug syndicates, we are still speaking of hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars. To put these sums into perspective, in FY1998 the overseas component of the U.S. government's budget for international drug control operations is approximately one and a half billion dollars. In dollar terms, that equates to approximately 15 metric tons of cocaine; the Mexican drug cartels have lost that much in a shipment or two and barely felt the loss.

Such inordinate wealth gives the large trafficking organizations an almost unlimited capacity to corrupt. In many ways, they are a less obvious threat to democratic government than many insurgent movements. Guerrilla armies or terrorist organizations openly seek to topple and replace governments through overt violence. The drug syndicates only want to manipulate governments to their advantage and guarantee themselves a secure operating environment. They do so by co-opting key officials. A real fear of democratic leaders should be that one day the drug trade might take de facto control of a country by putting a majority of elected officials, including the president, directly or indirectly on its payroll. Though it has yet to happen, there have been some disquieting near-misses. By keeping the focus on eliminating corruption, we can prevent the specter of a government manipulated by drug lords from becoming a reality.

A Weapon Against Corruption. Drug corruption relies on the low visibility of its operations. Since it shuns the light, the best way to attack drug corruption is to expose it regularly to public scrutiny. The drug certification process is one way of attacking such corruption. It gives the U.S. government the legislative equivalent of an international spotlight to shine on corruption. Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires the president to certify annually that each major drug-producing or transit country has cooperated fully or has taken adequate steps on its own to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, including rooting out public corruption. Governments that do not meet the standard lose eligibility for most forms of U.S. military and development assistance; they also face a mandatory "no" vote by the U.S. government on loans in six multilateral development banks.

Controversial, But Effective. The certification process has proved to be an unusually effective, if controversial, instrument of public diplomacy. In contrast to the confidentiality inherent in traditional bilateral diplomacy, public diplomacy stresses openness and transparency. By now, most governments are aware that U.S. law requires the president to provide an annual assessment of counter-narcotics cooperation based on objective information. By regular and sustained collaboration throughout the year, we work with most of the governments concerned to establish realistic, mutually acceptable goals for certification evaluation purposes. The value of the drug certification process is that every government concerned is publicly accountable for its actions, including the United States. While the U.S. government obviously cannot certify itself, most governments recognize that the president of the United States cannot make such an important public declaration without being certain of — and accountable for — his facts. Thus, in the certification process, the United States is opening itself up to the same public scrutiny by the international community. This

is a healthy process. The purpose of the law is not to punish; it is to hold all countries to a minimum acceptable international standard of cooperation, either by meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention in cooperation with the United States or through their own efforts. We know that some governments face greater obstacles than others, and we take that into account. We do not ask any country to do more than we are asking of ourselves.

NEXT STEPS

The results suggest that we are on the right path. In the year ahead, we will build upon our gains by pressing the drug trade at every point — targeting drug syndicates, reducing drug cultivation, destroying labs, disrupting the flow of the necessary processing chemicals, interdicting large drug shipments, and attacking drug money flows. Though we cannot neglect any stage in the process, we know that we can inflict the most lasting damage at the crop cultivation and financial operations stages. We have seen this year how cooperative ventures can pay off in reducing drug crop cultivation, and we will strengthen these programs. Now we need to beef up our collective efforts to obtain comparable gains against the illegal drug conglomerate's financial operations.

The drug trade's capacity for generating vast amounts of cash is both its strength and its weakness. It needs a steady flow of drugs to generate the money the drug syndicates require to stay in business, and it needs the steady flow of money to buy the drug. Since the drug trade, like a legitimate enterprise, partially finances future growth by borrowing against future earnings, every metric ton of drugs that does not make it to market represents a potential loss of tens of millions of dollars in essential revenue. On the revenue end of the process, cash proceeds are useless unless they can be reinvested in new drug crops, arms, bribes, etc. to keep the syndicates solvent. Choke off either the drugs or the money long enough, and the drug trade will suffer.

Our primary line of attack against domestic and international money laundering is to deny money launderers access to legitimate financial systems. Though drug syndicates are powerful in their own milieu, they lose their advantage when they have to operate in the legitimate world. Drug-trafficking organizations generate their profits in cash — enormous amounts of cash. To be useful, that cash must at one time or another pass through legitimate international banking or commercial channels. The very magnitude of the sums that make drug trafficking so profitable, however, makes the profits difficult to conceal from vigilant banking systems. Therefore, when criminal enterprises surface to bank their profits, they make themselves vulnerable to law enforcement actions.

Since our own strong financial system is often a target for money laundering, the U.S. government is working hard at home and abroad to prevent easy access directly into our banking and depository institutions. Other governments in increasing numbers are taking similar measures. While collectively we have made considerable progress, there are still nations that have not adequately addressed the need to take decisive action on this problem. Until they do, drug trafficking organizations will continue to take full advantage of these weak points to move

their illicit money though legitimate financial channels.

We will work closely with other governments and encourage them to strengthen their oversight mechanisms, tighten regulations, and strictly enforce money laundering laws. We will also work with them to develop means of quickly identifying, freezing, and, ultimately, forfeiting illegal drug proceeds before they can be invested. In our own case, we will continue to make full use of the International Economic Emergency Powers Act to prevent the drug trade and other branches of international organized crime from exploiting legitimate companies for criminal purposes.

The international antidrug effort has too much at stake to give up any of the precious gains we have made in the past few years. As one of the countries most affected by illegal drugs, the United States will continue to provide leadership and assistance to its partners in the global antidrug effort. We certainly have an important role to play. Yet ultimately, the success of this effort will hinge not on us alone, but on the actions, commitment, and cooperation of the other major drug-affected governments. We will help where we can, but only they can muster the necessary political will to shield their national sovereignty from drug corruption by reforming and strengthening their antidrug legislation, as well as their judicial, law enforcement, and banking institutions. In democracies, the drug trade flourishes only when it can divide the population and corrupt institutions. It cannot withstand a concerted, sustained attack by a coalition of nations individually committed to its annihilation. It is that coalition we are working to build.

Sources of Information

Bibliography

Books and Documents

Council on Foreign Relations. RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY. Council on Foreign Relations, 1997. 79p.

Delancey, Marci M.; Hannan, Denise M. INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO WORKPLACE SUBSTANCE-ABUSE PREVENTION. Washington, D.C.: Institute for a Drug-Free Workplace, 1994. 246p.

DeMet, Edward M. ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOR: MOLECULES TO MANKIND; PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATURE OF ADDICTION. St. Martin's Press, 1996. 312p.

DuPont, Robert L. THE SELFISH BRAIN: LEARNING FROM ADDICTION. American Psychiatric Press, 1997. 553p.

Early, Kevin E. DRUG TREATMENT BEHIND BARS: PRISON-BASED STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996. 192p.

Fulco, Carolyn E. and others, eds. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICATIONS FOR THE TREATMENT OF OPIATE AND COCAINE ADDICTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR. National Academy Press, 1995. 272p.

Graham, Kathryn and others. ADDICTIONS TREATMENT FOR OLDER ADULTS: EVALUATION OF AN INNOVATIVE CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH. Haworth Press, 1994. 244p.

Kandall, Stephan R.; Petrillo, Jennifer. SUBSTANCE AND SHADOW: WOMEN AND ADDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES. Harvard University Press, 1996. 384p.

Kirsch, Henry, ed. DRUG LESSONS AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. Transaction Publishers, 1995. 345p.

Knipe, Ed. CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND DRUGS: THE SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH TO DRUG USE. Waveland Press, 1995. 506p.

McCoy, Clyde B.; Metsch, Lisa R.; Inciardi, James A. INTERVENING WITH DRUG-INVOLVED YOUTH. Sage Publications, 1996. 272p.

Neff, Pauline. TOUGH LOVE: HOW PARENTS CAN DEAL WITH DRUG ABUSE. Abington Press, 1996. 160p.

Platt, Jerome J. HEROIN ADDICTION. Krieger Publishing Company, 1995. 3 vols., 1074p.

Powell, Richard R. and others. CLASSROOMS UNDER THE INFLUENCE: ADDICTED FAMILIES—ADDICTED STUDENTS. Corwin Press, 1995. 168p.

Rhodes, Tim; Hartnoll, Richard. AIDS, DRUGS AND PREVENTION: PERSPECTIVES ON INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY ACTION. Routledge, 1996. 240p.

Rotgers, Frederick and others, eds. TREATING SUBSTANCE ABUSE: THEORY AND TECHNIQUE. Guilford, 1996. 328p.

U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. BIOLOGICAL COMPONENTS OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ADDICTION. (OTA-BP-BBS-117) U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, 1993. 61p. Available on Internet at http://www.wws.princeton.edu:80/~ota/disk1/1993/9311_n.html

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Center for Substance Abuse Treatment. 50 STRATEGIES FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT. (DHHS Publication No. (SMA) 96-8029) Center for Substance Abuse Treatment, 1997. 148p.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. National Cancer Institute. COMMUNITY-BASED INTERVENTIONS FOR SMOKERS. (Monograph 6, NIH Publication No. 95-4028) National Cancer Institute, 1995. 252p.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. National Institute on Drug Abuse. PREVENTING DRUG USE AMONG CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS; A RESEARCH-BASED GUIDE. (NIH Publication No. 97-4212) National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1997. 38p.

U.S. Executive Office of the President. Office of National Drug Control Policy. THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: 1998. U. S. Government Printing Office, 1998. Available on Internet at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/policy/98ndcs/contents.html

U.S. General Accounting Office. DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE: BILLIONS SPENT ANNUALLY FOR TREATMENT AND PREVENTION ACTIVITIES. (GAO/HEHS-97-12) U. S. General Accounting Office, 1996. 69p. Available on Internet at http://www.gao.gov/AIndexFY97/abstracts/he97012.htm

U.S. Institute of Medicine. PATHWAYS OF ADDICTION: OPPORTUNITIES IN DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH. National Academy Press, 1996. 290p.

Articles

Bower, Bruce. ALCOHOLICS SYNONYMOUS (Science News, Vol. 151, No. 4, January 25, 1997, p. 62)

Breer, Paul; McAuliffe, William E.; Levine, Eliot B. STATEWIDE SUBSTANCE ABUSE PREVENTION PLANNING (Evaluation Review, Vol. 20, No. 5, October 1996, pp. 596+)

Califano, Joseph A., Jr. LEGALIZATION OF NARCOTICS: MYTHS AND REALITY (USA Today, Vol. 125, No. 2622, March 1997, pp. 46-47)

Dusenbury, Linda; Falco, Mathea. ELEVEN COMPONENTS OF EFFECTIVE DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION CURRICULA (Journal of School Health, Vol. 65, No. 10, December 1995, pp. 420-425)

Glass, Stephen. DON'T YOU D.A.R.E. (New Republic, Vol. 216, No. 9, March 3, 1997, pp. 18-28)

Inciardi, James A.; Saum, Christine A. LEGALIZATION MADNESS (Public Interest, No. 123, Spring 1996, pp. 72-82)

Landry, Donald W. IMMUNOTHERAPY FOR COCAINE ADDICTION (Scientific American, Vol. 276, No. 2, February 1997, pp. 42-45)

Lee, Rensselaer W., III. CUBA'S DRUG TRANSIT TRAFFIC (Society, Vol. 34, No. 3, March/April 1997, pp. 49-55)

McCaffrey, Barry. HEMISPHERIC DRUG CONTROL: FIGHTING DRUG PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING (Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 63, No. 14, May 1, 1997, pp. 418-421)

Nash, J. Madeleine. ADDICTED (THE CHEMISTRY OF ADDICTION) (Time, Vol. 149, No. 18, May 5, 1997, pp. 68-73, 76)

Navarro, Mireya. EXPERIMENTAL COURTS ARE USING NEW STRATEGIES TO BLUNT THE LURE OF DRUGS (New York Times, October 17, 1996, p. A25)

Peck, Richard L. THE ADDICTED BRAIN: AN ERA OF SCIENTIFIC BREAKTHROUGHS (Behavioral Health Management, Vol. 16, No. 5, September/October 1996, pp. 33+)

Peele, Stanton. RECOVERING FROM AN ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH TO ALCOHOL (Psychology Today, Vol. 29, No. 5, September/October 1996, pp. 35-43+)

Pentz, Mary Ann; Bonnie, Richard J.; Shopland, Donald R. INTEGRATING SUPPLY AND DEMAND REDUCTION STRATEGIES FOR DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION (American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 39, No. 7, June/July 1996, pp. 897-910)

Prendergast, Michael L.; Anglin, M. Douglas; Wellisch, Jean. TREATMENT FOR DRUG-ABUSING OFFENDERS UNDER COMMUNITY SUPERVISION (Federal Probation, Vol. 59, No. 4, December 1995, pp. 66-75)

Tauber, Jeffrey. DRUG COURTS: TREATING DRUG-USING OFFENDERS THROUGH SANCTIONS, INCENTIVES (Corrections Today, Vol. 56, No. 1, February 1994, pp. 28-30+)

Terry, W. Clinton, III. DEDICATED DRUG TREATMENT COURTS: A COLLABORATIVE MODEL OF JUSTICE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT (Spectrum, Vol. 69, No. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 37-47)

Volkow, N. D. and others. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBJECTIVE EFFECTS OF COCAINE AND DOPAMINE TRANSPORTER OCCUPANCY (Nature, Vol. 386, No. 6627, April 24, 1997, pp. 827-830)

Internet Links

The U.S. Information Agency assumes no responsibility for the current content and/or availability of these resources.

U.S. Government Sources

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), U.S. Department of State
INL plans, implements, and oversees international narcotics and control activities. Its home page contains its mission statement; its annual strategy report; information on narcotics control, its rewards program, current country programs, country certifications, and crime control; key speeches and congressional testimony; and a glossary.
http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Department of Justice
DEA is the lead federal agency in enforcing narcotics and controlled substance laws and regulations. Its home page lists its programs, publications, fugitives, statistics, and acquisitions.
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/index.htm

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), U.S. Department of the Treasury
FinCEN's mission is to support and strengthen domestic and international anti-money-laundering efforts and to foster interagency and global cooperation to that end. Its home page covers "what's new," frequently asked questions, a 25-year chronology of activities under the Bank Security Act, a summary of global efforts to combat money laundering, news releases, advisories, publications, and Bank Security Act forms.
http://www.ustreas.gov/fincen

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Program
The HIDTA program provides resources to areas of the United States identified as having the most critical drug-trafficking problems that affect the rest of the country. HIDTA creates federal, state, and local partnerships in these critical drug-trafficking area to tailor antidrug goals into regional solutions. Its National HIDTA Information Unit serves as a clearinghouse so that all regions may give and receive information on topics, trends, and important developments that impact everyone involved in America's fight against drugs.
http://www.hidta.org

National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), U.S. Department of Justice
NCJRS is an extensive source of information on criminal and juvenile justice in the world. The Drugs and Crime section of its Justice Information Center home page links to documents on community efforts and prevention, corrections, courts, drug testing, drug treatment, drug use indicators, enforcement, policy and law, and research and evaluation.
http://www.ncjrs.org

National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), National Institutes of Health, Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
NIDA provides national leadership and conducts and supports biomedical and behavioral research, health services research, research training, and health information related to the prevention of drug abuse and to treatment. Its home page contains information on drugs of abuse, publications, events, international activities, and links to related Web sites.
http://www.nida.nih.gov

Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)
ONDCP, which is part of the Executive Office of the President, coordinates federal, state, and local efforts to control illegal drug abuse and devises national strategies to effectively carry out antidrug activities. Its home page — in addition to including the National Drug Control Strategy and international drug facts and figures — deals with drug prevention/education, treatment, and enforcement.
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
http://www.samhsa.gov
SAMHSA's mission is to ensure that quality substance abuse and mental health services are available to people who need them and that prevention and treatment knowledge is used more effectively in the general health care system. Its home page includes publications, reports, and statistical information, including estimates of drug-related hospital emergency department episodes, grant and contract opportunities, managed care initiatives, and links to related Internet resources, including three elements that fall within its purview:

- Center for Substance Abuse Prevention, whose home page includes a fact sheet on successful prevention, a workplace help line, and a teleconferencing initiative on helping youth stay drug free

http://www.samhsa.gov/csap/index.htm

- Center for Substance Abuse Treatment, whose home page includes the National Treatment Improvement Evaluation Study, a forum Web site on treatment improvement exchange, and information on improvement protocols
http://www.samhsa.gov/csat/csat.htm
- Prevention Online and the National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information, which contain current information and materials about alcohol and other drugs and a collection of primary prevention materials
http://www.health.org

U.S. Private/Nonprofit Organizations

American Council for Drug Educators (ACDE)
The mission of ACDE is to diminish substance abuse by gathering, analyzing, and monitoring current scientific data; developing preemptive and responsive programs and materials; and disseminating information through all viable means. Its home page includes a link to the ACDE library — a resource of publications, articles, and on-line sites for further information on substances, education, and prevention.
http://www.acde.org

Drug Policy Research Center (DPRC), Rand
DPRC conducts empirical research, policy analysis, and outreach to help community leaders and public officials develop more effective strategies for dealing with drug problems. Its home page includes a subject index and abstracts of all DPRC publications that are available for purchase.
http://www.rand.org/centers/dprc

Parents' Resource Institute for Drug Education (PRIDE)
PRIDE is aimed at assisting parents in building drug-free homes. Its home page includes information and statistics on drug use and a compilation of national press releases.
http://www/prideusa.org/left.htm

Partnership for a Drug-Free America
The Partnership for a Drug-Free America is a private, nonprofit, non-partisan coalition of professionals from the communications industry that works to "un-sell" drugs to children through media communication. Its Drug-Free Resource Net includes a comprehensive database on what drugs look like and what they do, frequently asked questions on drug-related topics, and advice to parents on raising a drug-free child.
http://www.drugfreeamerica.org

International Organizations

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)
EMCDDA is one of 11 European decentralized agencies set up by the European Union to carry out specialized technical or scientific work on subjects ranging from education and training to the environment — and in the case of EMCDDA, drugs, drug addiction, and their consequences. Its home page covers its activities, its partners, its publications (including highlights of the Annual Report on the State of Drugs in the European Union, available in a number of languages), and frequently asked questions.
http://www.emcdda.org/left_index.html

Inter-American Drug Control Abuse Commission (CICAD)
CICAD was established by the Organization of American States (OAS) to promote and facilitate multilateral cooperation among member countries in the control of drug trafficking, production, and use. It supports drug control activities region-wide in five priority areas: demand reduction, institution building in the national drug commissions, legal development, the Inter-American Drug Information System (IADIS — a system of 38 specialized drug information centers throughout the Western Hemisphere), and supply reduction. Its home page elaborates on these activities and includes, as well, links to basic documents and the IADIS.
http://www.oas.org/EN/PROG/w3/index.htm
(English and Spanish)

Programme on Substance Abuse (PSA), World Health Organization
The Programme on Substance Abuse plays the leading role within the World Health Organization in supporting countries in preventing and reducing the problems due to psychoactive substance use and in recommending which psychoactive substances should be regulated. Its home page describes the role and work of PSA and includes a section on global trends in psychoactive substance use.
http://www.who.ch/programmes/psa/psa.htm

United Nations International Drug Control Programme
UNDCP works with nations and the people of the world to tackle the global drug problem and its consequences. Its home page describes its mission and activities, and includes the first World Drug Report and a report of a special session of the UN General Assembly on Drug Control.
http://www.undcp.org/undcp.html

United States Information Agency
www.usia.gov/usis.html